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jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with PROPOSALS

12150

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules
mind, the Commission proposes upfront payments based on $0.003 per MHzpop, with a minimum of $500 per license. Given the uncertain total amount of available white space spectrum in each 2.5 GHz band license pending resolution of Rural Tribal Priority Window applications and other factors, the Commission proposes to base upfront payments on the total potential MHz-pops of each license offered in the auction, rather than on available white space in each block. For the 49.5 megahertz and 50.5 megahertz blocks, the Commission proposes to base the calculation on 50 megahertz.
Additionally, when calculating upfront payment amounts, the Commission proposes to round the results of calculations as follows: Results below $1,000 will be rounded down to the nearest $100; results between $1,000
and $10,000 will be rounded down to the nearest $1,000; results between $10,000 and $100,000 will be rounded down to the nearest $10,000; and results above $100,000 will be rounded down to the nearest $100,000. The proposed rounding procedures would lessen the differences between upfront payment amounts for licenses in counties with similar population instead of reflecting relatively small differences in total potential MHz-pops that are not necessarily representative of the available white space.
23. The Commission seeks comment on these upfront payment amounts, which are specified in the Attachment A file on the Auction 108 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/108. If commenters believe that these upfront payment amounts are not reasonable amounts, they should explain their reasoning and suggest an alternative approach.
24. The Commission further proposes that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder would determine its bidding eligibility in bidding units, which are a measure of bidder eligibility and bidding activity. The upfront payment does not limit the dollar amounts of the bids that a bidder may submit. The Commission proposes to assign each license that is available to be assigned a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per $100 of the upfront payment listed in the Attachment A file. The number of bidding units for a given license is fixed and does not change during the auction.
25. Calculating Upfront Payments in the Single-Round Format. To the extent that a bidder wishes to bid on multiple licenses simultaneously, it would need to ensure that its upfront payment provides enough eligibility to cover the total bidding units associated with the
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licenses that the bidder can win given the bids it intends to submit. Under the single-round approach, a bidders upfront payment would not be attributed to specific licenses. A bidder may place bids on multiple licenses consistent with its selections in its FCC
Form 175, provided that the maximum number of bidding units associated with the licenses that the bidder can win does not exceed its bidding eligibility.
Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, and hence its bidding eligibility, an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units needed to cover licenses that it may wish to win in the auction and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of bidding units. The Commission seeks comment on these procedures.
26. Calculating Upfront Payments in the SMR Format. If the Commission adopts the SMR auction format discussed below, a bidder that wishes to bid on multiple licenses simultaneously similarly would need to ensure that its upfront payment provides enough eligibility. A bidder would be able to place bids on multiple licenses, provided that the total number of bidding units associated with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount and hence its initial bidding eligibility under this approach, an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid or hold provisionally winning bids in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of bidding units. The Commission seeks comment on this approach to upfront payments under an SMR auction format.
F. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation 27. For Auction 108, the Commission proposes that, at any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 108 in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, network interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In such a case, OEA would notify participants of any such delay, suspension, or cancellation by public notice and/or through the FCC
auction bidding systems announcement function. If the bidding is delayed or suspended, OEA, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the auction starting
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from the beginning of the round, or it may cancel the auction in its entirety subject to the scheduling in due course of another auction for this spectrum.
The Commission emphasizes that OEA
and WTB would exercise the authority to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 108 solely at their discretion.
The Commission seeks comment on this proposal.
G. Additional Default Payment Percentage 28. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of an auction i.e., fails to remit the required down payment by the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely longform application, fails to make full and timely final payment, or is otherwise disqualified is liable for a default payment under 47 CFR 1.2104g2.
This payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to the difference between the amount of the bidders winning bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of the defaulters bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is less.
29. The Commissions rules provide that, in advance of each auction, it will establish a percentage between 3% and 20% of the applicable winning bid to be assessed as an additional default payment. The level of this additional payment in each auction will be based on the nature of the service and the licenses being offered.
30. For Auction 108, the Commission proposes to establish an additional default payment of 15%, which is consistent with that adopted for prior auctions of spectrum suitable for 5G and other advanced wireless services. As noted in the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 71 FR 6214, February 7, 2006, defaults weaken the integrity of the auction process and may impede the deployment of service to the public, and an additional default payment of up to 20% will be more effective in deterring defaults than the 3% used in some earlier auctions. At the same time, the Commission does not believe the detrimental effects of any defaults in Auction 108 are likely to be unusually great. In light of these considerations, the Commission proposes for Auction 108 an additional default payment of 15% of the relevant bid. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal.

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