Je veux savoir à propos de…

jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules associated with operating in the 2.5 GHz band, the potential number and value of new overlay licenses, past auction data, or any other considerations justify a higher cap for either type of bidding credit? Moreover, are there convincing reasons for not maintaining parity with the bidding credit caps adopted in previous auctions of spectrum suitable for 5G? Commenters are encouraged to identify unique circumstances and characteristics of this mid-band auction that should guide us in establishing bidding credit caps, and to provide specific, data-driven arguments in support of their proposals.
15. The Commission reminds applicants applying for designated entity bidding credits that they should take due account of the requirements of the Commissions rules and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control of such applicants.
These rules include a prohibition, which applies to all applicants whether or not they are seeking bidding credits starting at the short-form application filing deadline, against changes in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control. Under 47 CFR 1.2107c, the winning bidder must be the entity that files the post-auction long-form application. Pursuant to 47 CFR
1.929a2, any substantial change in ownership or control of an applicant is classified as a major amendment.
Applicants should not expect to receive any opportunities to revise their ownership structure after the filing of their shortand long-form applications, including making revisions to their agreements or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders, or others in order to address potential concerns relating to compliance with the designated entity bidding credit requirements. This policy will help to ensure compliance with the Commissions rules applicable to the award of bidding credits prior to the start of bidding in this auction, which will involve competing bids from those who do and do not seek bidding credits, and thus preserves the integrity of the auction process. In furtherance of this policy, applicants will not be permitted to change their bidding credit type selection i.e., from small business to rural service provider, or vice versa after the short-form deadline. The Commission also believes that this will meet its objectives in awarding licenses through the competitive bidding process.

VerDate Sep<11>2014

16:34 Mar 01, 2021

Jkt 253001

C. Prohibition of Certain Communications 16. Section 1.2105c1 of the Commissions rules, 47 CFR
1.2105c1, provides that, subject to specified exceptions, after the shortform application filing deadline, all applicants are prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to, communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any nationwide provider of communications services that is not an applicant, or, if the applicant is a nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of their own, or each others, or any other applicants bids or bidding strategies including post-auction market structure, or discussing or negotiating settlement agreements, until after the down payment deadline.
Section 1.2105c5i, 47 CFR
1.2105c5i, defines applicant as including all officers and directors of the entity submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest amounting to 10% or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form application.
17. Nationwide Providers Subject to the Prohibition of Certain Communications. The operation of the rule prohibiting certain communications requires that the Commission identify each nationwide provider for purposes of 1.2105c1 in connection with each auction. Accordingly, consistent with the procedures adopted for prior auctions of flexible-use licenses for advanced wireless services, the Commission proposes to identify AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as nationwide providers for the purpose of implementing its competitive bidding rules in Auction 108, including 1.2105c, the rule prohibiting certain communications. This is consistent with the Commissions identification of nationwide providers in the 2020
Communications Marketplace Report.
The Commission seeks comment on this proposal.
D. Information Procedures During the Auction Process 18. As an additional safeguard to further prevent the sharing of information about applicants bids and bidding strategies and to discourage unproductive and anti-competitive strategic behavior, the Commission proposes to limit information available in Auction 108 in order to prevent the
PO 00000

Frm 00031

Fmt 4702

Sfmt 4702

12149

identification of bidders placing particular bids until after the bidding has closed. The Commission has instituted limited information procedures in most recent spectrum auctions. While the Commission generally makes available to the public information provided in each applicants FCC Form 175 following an initial review by Commission staff, it proposes to not make public until after bidding has closed: 1 The licenses that an applicant selects for bidding in its FCC Form 175, 2 the amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for Auction 108, 3 any applicants bidding eligibility, and 4
any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid.
19. As in past Commission auctions, the Commission will not make public during a bidding round any real-time information on bidding activity. Bidders would have access both during and after a round to information related to their own bidding activity and eligibility. For example, bidders would be able to view their own levels of eligibility and submitted activity through the FCC
auction bidding system.
20. After the close of bidding, bidders license selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related information would be made publicly available.
21. The Commission seeks comment on the above details of its proposal for implementing limited information procedures, or anonymous bidding, in Auction 108. Commenters opposing the use of limited information procedures in Auction 108 should explain their reasoning and propose alternative information rules.
E. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility 22. In keeping with the Commissions usual practice in spectrum license auctions, the Commission proposes that applicants be required to submit upfront payments as a prerequisite to becoming qualified to bid. As described below, the upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by an applicant to establish its eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of bidding. The Commission notes that its rules require that any auction applicant that, pursuant to 47 CFR
1.2106a2xii, certifies that it is a former defaulter must submit an upfront payment equal to 50% more than the amount that otherwise would be required. With these considerations in
E:FRFM02MRP1.SGM

02MRP1