Federal Register - December 1, 2021
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Source: Federal Register
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 228 / Wednesday, December 1, 2021 / Proposed Rules
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ability to place additional bids in the auction. A reduction in the bidders eligibility would be to the amount that would bring the bidder into compliance with the activity requirement. With a 100% activity requirement, a bidders eligibility would be reduced to equal its activity. OEA and MB seek comment on these activity requirements. OEA and MB encourage commenters that oppose a 100% activity requirement to explain their reasons with specificity and to propose alternative approaches.
F. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility 34. For the proposed simultaneous multiple-round auction format, OEA
and MB propose that when a bidders activity in the current round is below the required minimum level, it may preserve its current level of eligibility through an activity rule waiver, if the bidder has any available. Consistent with prior Commission auctions of broadcast construction permits, OEA
and MB propose that each bidder in Auction 112 be provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used as set forth below at the bidders discretion during the course of the auction.
35. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding, not to a particular construction permit. Activity rule waivers can be either proactive or automatic. Activity rule waivers are primarily a mechanism for a bidder to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in case exigent circumstances prevent it from bidding in a particular round.
36. The FCC auction bidding system will assume that a bidder that does not meet the activity requirement would prefer to use an activity rule waiver if available rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round in which a bidders activity level is below the minimum required unless: 1 The bidder has no activity rule waiver remaining; or 2 the bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the activity requirement. If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required activity level, the bidders current eligibility will be permanently reduced, possibly curtailing or eliminating the ability to place additional bids in the auction.
37. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the bidding round by using the reduce eligibility
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function in the FCC auction bidding system. In this case, the bidders eligibility would be permanently reduced to bring it into compliance with the activity rule described above.
Reducing eligibility is an irreversible action; once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder cannot regain its lost bidding eligibility.
38. Under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, a bidder would be permitted to apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid.
If a bidder proactively applies an activity rule waiver using the proactive waiver function in the FCC auction bidding system during a bidding round in which no bid is placed or withdrawn if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction, the auction will remain open and the bidders eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC auction bidding system in a round in which there is no new bid, no bid withdrawal if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction, or no proactive waiver would not keep the auction open. OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals.
G. Bid Amounts 39. OEA and MB propose that, in each round, a qualified bidder will be able to place a bid on a given construction permit in any of up to nine different amounts: The minimum acceptable bid amount or one of eight additional bid amounts. Bidders must have sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the particular construction permit.
40. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts. The first of the acceptable bid amounts is called the minimum acceptable bid amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a construction permit will be equal to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally winning bid for the construction permit. Once there is a provisionally winning bid for a construction permit, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that construction permit will be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus a specified percentage of that bid amount. The percentage used for this calculation, the minimum acceptable bid increment percentage, is multiplied by the provisionally winning bid amount, and the resulting amount is added to the provisionally winning bid amount. If, for example, the minimum acceptable bid increment percentage is 10%, then the provisionally winning bid amount is multiplied by 10%. The result of that calculation is added to the provisionally winning bid amount, and that sum is rounded using the
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Commissions standard rounding procedure for auctions. The result of the calculation is subject to a minimum of $100 and results above $10,000 are rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; and results below $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $10. If bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction, in the case of a construction permit for which the provisionally winning bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the construction permit.
41. Additional Bid Amounts. Under this proposal, the Commission will calculate the eight additional bid amounts using the minimum acceptable bid amount and an additional bid increment percentage. The minimum acceptable bid amount is multiplied by the additional bid increment percentage, and that result rounded is the additional increment amount. The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount plus the additional increment amount.
The second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount plus two times the additional increment amount; the third additional acceptable bid amount is the minimum acceptable bid amount plus three times the additional increment amount; etc. If, for example, the additional bid increment percentage is 5%, then the calculation of the additional increment amount would be minimum acceptable bid amount
0.05, rounded. The first additional acceptable bid amount equals minimum acceptable bid amount +
additional increment amount; the second additional acceptable bid amount equals minimum acceptable bid amount + 2 additional increment amount; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals minimum acceptable bid amount +
3 additional increment amount; etc.
42. For Auction 112, OEA and MB
propose to use a minimum acceptable bid increment percentage of 10%. This means that the minimum acceptable bid amount for a construction permit will be approximately 10% greater than the provisionally winning bid amount for the construction permit. To calculate the additional acceptable bid amounts, OEA and MB propose to use a bid increment percentage of 5%. OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals.
43. Bid Amount Changes. OEA and MB propose to retain the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the additional bid increment
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