Federal Register - December 1, 2021

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Source: Federal Register

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 228 / Wednesday, December 1, 2021 / Proposed Rules adjusted in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. Under this proposal, such changes may include the amount of time for the bidding rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors. OEA
and MB seek comment on this proposal.
Parties commenting on this issue should address the role of the bidding schedule in managing the pace of the auction, specifically discussing the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by bidding schedule changes, by changing the activity requirements or bid amount parameters, or by using other means.

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C. Stopping Rule 27. OEA and MB have discretion to establish stopping rules before or during multiple-round auctions in order to complete the auction within a reasonable time. For Auction 112, OEA
and MB propose to employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach, which means all construction permits remain available for bidding until bidding stops on every construction permit. Specifically, bidding will close on all construction permits after the first round in which no bidder submits any new bid, applies a proactive activity rule waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bid if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction. Thus, under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, bidding would remain open on all construction permits until bidding stops on every construction permit. Consequently, under this approach, it is not possible to determine in advance how long the bidding in this auction will last.
28. Further, OEA and MB propose to retain the discretion to exercise any of the following stopping options during Auction 112:
Option 1. The auction would close for all construction permits after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws a provisionally winning bid if withdrawals are permitted in this auction, or no bidder places any new bid on a construction permit for which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a construction permit for which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule.
Option 2. The auction would close for all construction permits after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws a provisionally winning bid if withdrawals are permitted in this auction, or no bidder places any new bid on a construction permit that already has a
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provisionally winning bid. Absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on an FCC-held construction permit a construction permit that does not already have a provisionally winning bid would not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule.
Option 3. The auction would close using a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that combines Option 1 and Option 2 above.
Option 4. The auction would close after a specified number of additional rounds special stopping rule to be announced in advance in the FCC auction bidding system.
If OEA and MB invoke this special stopping rule, they will accept bids in the specified final rounds, after which the auction will close.
Option 5. The auction would remain open even if no bidder places any new bid, applies a waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bid if withdrawals are permitted in this auction. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a waiver.
The activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a waiver.

29. OEA and MB propose to exercise these options only in certain circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding unusually slowly or quickly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period or will close prematurely. Before exercising these options, OEA and MB are likely to attempt to change the pace of the auction. For example, OEA and MB may adjust the pace of bidding by changing the number of bidding rounds per day or the minimum acceptable bids. Under the proposal, OEA would retain the discretion to exercise any of these options with or without prior announcement during the auction. OEA
and MB seek comment on these proposals. Commenters should provide specific reasons for supporting or objecting to these proposals.
D. Availability of Bidding Information 30. OEA and MB propose to make available, after each round closes, for each permit its current provisionally winning bid amount, the minimum acceptable bid amount for the following round, and the amounts of all bids placed on the permit during the round.
These reports would be publicly accessible. Moreover, after the auction closes, OEA and MB propose to make available complete reports of all bids placed during each round of the auction, including bidder identities.
31. OEA and MB also propose to provide bidders with secure access to certain non-public bidding information while bidding is ongoing. Specifically, after each round ends, and before the
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next round begins, OEA and MB
propose to make the following information available to individual bidders:
The bidders activity, based on all bids in the previous round; and Summary statistics of the bidders bidding and other bidding-related actions in each round, including the permits on which it bid and the price it bid for each of those permits, the result of each of its bids, whether it has any provisionally winning bids, and remaining activity rule waivers.
32. OEA and MB believe that limiting the availability of bidding information during the auction balances the Commissions interest in providing bidders with sufficient information about the status of their own bids and the general level of bidding on all permits to allow them to bid confidently and effectively, while restricting the availability of information that may facilitate identification of bidders placing particular bids, which could potentially lead to undesirable strategic bidding. OEA and MB seek comment on this view.
E. Activity Rule 33. To ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before participating. For purposes of the activity rule, the FCC auction bidding system calculates a bidders activity in a round as the sum of the bidding units associated with any construction permits upon which it places bids during the current round and the bidding units associated with any construction permits for which it holds provisionally winning bids. Bidders are required to be active on a specific percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction. OEA and MB propose a singlestage auction with a 100% activity requirement. That is, in each bidding round, a bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required to be active on 100% of its bidding eligibility. Under this proposal, the activity requirement would be satisfied when a bidder has bidding activity on construction permits with bidding units that total 100% of its current eligibility in the round. If the activity rule is met, then the bidders eligibility does not change in the next round. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidders eligibility for the next round of bidding, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidders
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Federal Register - December 1, 2021

TitoloFederal Register

PaeseStati Uniti

Data01/12/2021

Conteggio pagine294

Numero di edizioni7803

Prima edizione14/03/1936

Ultima edizione26/06/2026

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