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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 118 / Wednesday, June 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
eligibility permits during the bid processing. However, OEA and WTB
emphasize that even under these additional procedures, the bidders activity as applied by the auction system during bid processing will not exceed the bidders current bidding eligibility. That is, if a bidder submits bids with associated bidding units exceeding 100% of its current bidding eligibility, its processed activity cannot exceed its eligibility.
191. Under these procedures, after Round 1 a bidder may submit bids with bidding units totaling up to a contingent bidding limit equal to the bidders current bidding eligibility for the round times a percentage the contingent bidding percentage equal to or greater than 100%. The Commission has previously referred to the contingent bidding limit as the activity upper limit, and similarly, to the contingent bidding percentage as the activity limit percentage. OEA and WTB modify those terms to remind bidders that bids submitted using the contingent bidding limit will be applied only under certain circumstances. For Round 1, the contingent bidding limit would be 100% of the bidders initial bidding eligibility. OEA and WTB adopt an initial contingent bidding percentage of 120% to apply beginning in Round 2.
This limit will be subject to change in subsequent rounds within a range of 100% to 140%. In any bidding round, the auction bidding system will advise the bidder of its current bidding eligibility, its required bidding activity, and its contingent bidding limit. The Auction 110 Clock Phase Technical Guide provides examples of use of the contingent bidding limit, and bidders are encouraged to review them.
192. As with the activity requirement percentage, OEA will retain the discretion to change the contingent bidding percentage during the auction and will announce any such changes in advance of the round in which they would take effect.
193. Missing bids. Under the clock auction format, bidders are required to indicate their demands in every round, even if their demands at the new rounds prices are unchanged from the previous round. Missing bidsbids that are not reconfirmedare treated by the auction bidding system as requests to reduce to a quantity of zero blocks for the product. If these requests are applied, or applied partially, then a bidders bidding activity, and its bidding eligibility for the next round, may be reduced. in which they would take effect.
194. For Auction 110, OEA and WTB
will not provide for activity rule waivers
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to preserve a bidders eligibility. OEA
and WTB note that the procedures to permit a bidder to submit bids with bidding activity greater than its eligibility, within the precise limits set forth above, will address some of the circumstances under which a bidder risks losing bidding eligibility and otherwise could wish to use a bidding activity waiver, while minimizing any potential adverse impacts on bidder incentives to bid sincerely and on the price setting mechanism of the clock auction. This approach not to allow waivers is consistent with the ascending clock auction procedures used in other FCC clock auctions. The clock auction relies on precisely identifying the point at which demand decreases to equal supply to determine winning bidders and final prices. Allowing waivers would create uncertainty with respect to the exact level of bidder demand and would interfere with the basic clock price-setting and winner determination mechanism. Moreover, uncertainty about the level of demand would affect the way bidders requests to reduce demand are processed by the bidding system, as addressed below.
7. Acceptable Bids a. Minimum Opening Bids 195. As is typical for each auction, the Commission sought comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and/
or reserve price, as mandated by section 309j of the Communications Act. OEA
and WTB will establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 110.
The bidding system will not accept bids lower than the minimum opening bids for each product. Based on the Commissions experience in past auctions, setting minimum opening bid amounts judiciously is an effective tool for accelerating the competitive bidding process.
196. For Auction 110, the Commission proposed to calculate minimum opening bid amounts based on bandwidth and license area population using a tiered approach under which the calculation would vary by market population. The Commission proposed minimum opening bid amounts for a block in a PEA based on $0.06 per MHz-pop for PEAs 150 and $0.02 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to a minimum of $1000.
197. Based on comments in the record, however, OEA and WTB adopt revised, lower minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 110. Specifically, OEA and WTB adopt minimum opening bid amounts for a block in a PEA based on $0.03 per MHz-pop for PEAs 150, $0.006 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51100,
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and $0.003 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to a minimum of $1000.
These minimum opening bid amounts are set forth in the Attachment A file on the Auction 110 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/110.
b. Clock Price Increments 198. OEA and WTB adopt the proposed procedures regarding clock price increments for Auction 110.
Accordingly, after bidding in the first round and before each subsequent round, the bidding system will announce the start-of-round price also referred to as the posted price of the previous round and the clock price for the upcoming roundthat is, the lowest price and the highest price at which bidders can specify the number of blocks they demand during the round.
As long as aggregate demand for blocks in the product exceeds the supply of blocks, the start-of-round price will be equal to the clock price from the prior round. If demand equaled supply at a price in a previous round, then the startof-round price for the next round will be equal to the price at which demand equaled supply. If demand was less than supply in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the next round will not increase.
199. OEA will set the clock price for blocks in a specific product for a round by adding a percentage increment to the start-of-round price. For example, if the start-of-round price for a block of a given product is $10,000, and the percentage increment is 20%, then the clock price for the round will be $12,000. The result of the clock price calculation will be rounded as follows:
results above $10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $1,000, and results below $10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $100. OEA will set the initial increment percentage at 10%, and may adjust the increment within a range of 5% to 20% inclusive, as rounds continue. The total dollar amount of the increment the difference between the clock price and the start-of-round price will be capped at a certain amount. OEA
will set this cap on the increment initially at $50 million and may adjust the cap as rounds continue. The proposed 5% to 20% increment range and cap will allow OEA to set a percentage that manages the auction pace and takes into account bidders needs to evaluate their bidding strategies while moving the auction along quickly.
c. Intra-Round Bids 200. As proposed, OEA and WTB will permit a bidder to make intra-round bids by indicating a point between the
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