Federal Register - June 23, 2021

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Source: Federal Register

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 118 / Wednesday, June 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations to submit its bids using the bidding systems upload function, which allows bid files in a comma-separated values CSV text format to be uploaded. The bidding system will not allow bids to be submitted unless the bidder selected the PEAs on its FCC Form 175, the bidder has sufficient bidding eligibility, and the bids, if applied, are consistent with the aggregation limit of 40 megahertz in a PEA.
181. During each round of the bidding, a bidder will also be able to remove bids placed in the current bidding round. If a bidder modifies its bids for blocks in a PEA in a round, the system will take the last bid submission as that bidders bid for the round. No bids may be withdrawn after the close of a round. Unlike an auction conducted using the Commissions simultaneous multiple-round auction format, there are no provisionally winning bids in a clock auction. As a result, the concept of bid withdrawals as used in simultaneous multiple-round auctions does not apply to a clock auction.

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4. Stopping Rule 182. OEA and WTB adopt a simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 110, under which all blocks in all PEAs will remain available for bidding until the bidding stops in every PEA.
Specifically, bidding will close for all blocks after the first round in which there is no excess demand in any product. Excess demand is calculated as the difference between the number of blocks of aggregate demand and supply.
Under this approach, it is not possible to determine in advance how long Auction 110 will last.
5. Availability of Bidding Information 183. OEA and WTB adopt the proposal to make public after each clock phase bidding round, for each category in each PEA: The supply, the aggregate demand, the posted price of the last completed round, and the clock price for the next round. The posted price of the previous round is, generally, the start-of-round price if supply exceeds demand; the clock price of the previous round if demand exceeds supply; or the price at which a reduction caused demand to equal supply. The identities of bidders demanding blocks in a specific category or PEA will not be disclosed until after Auction 110
concludes i.e., after the close of bidding.
184. OEA will also make public after each clock phase bidding round whether the reserve price has been met, that is, whether the estimated total cash proceeds based on the bids in the most recently completed round would satisfy
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the CSEA requirement. If the reserve has not yet been met, each bidder will be informed about the shortfall between the reserve and the estimated total cash proceeds, rounded up to the nearest million. This shortfall information will not be publicly available during the auction.
185. Each bidder will have access to additional information related to its own bidding and bid eligibility.
Specifically, after the bids of a round have been processed, the bidding system will inform each bidder of the number of blocks it holds after the round its processed demand for every product and its eligibility for the next round.
186. Limiting the availability of bidding information during the auction balances the Commissions interest in providing bidders with sufficient information about the status of their own bids and the general level of bidding in all areas and license categories to allow them to bid confidently and effectively, while restricting the availability of information that may facilitate identification of bidders placing particular bids, which could potentially lead to undesirable strategic bidding.
6. Activity Requirement, Contingent Bidding Limit, and Missing Bids 187. Activity requirement. To ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before participating. For this clock auction, a bidders activity in a round for purposes of the activity rule will be the sum of the bidding units associated with the bidders demands as applied by the auction system during bid processing.
Bidders are required to be active on a specific percentage the activity requirement percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidders eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidders ability to place bids in subsequent rounds of the auction.
188. OEA and WTB adopt the proposal to require that bidders maintain a fixed, high level of activity in each round of Auction 110 in order to maintain bidding eligibility.
Specifically, bidders must be active on between 90% and 100% of their bidding eligibility in all clock rounds, with the specific percentage within this range to be set for each round. Thus, the activity rule will be satisfied when a bidder has bidding activity on blocks with bidding
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units that total 90% to 100% of its current eligibility in the round. OEA
will set the activity requirement percentage initially at 95%. If the activity rule is met, then the bidders eligibility will not change for the next round. If the activity rule is not met in a round, the bidders eligibility will be reduced. Bidding activity will be based on the bids that are applied by the FCC
auction bidding system. That is, if a bidder requests a reduction in the quantity of blocks it demands in a product, but the bidding system cannot apply the request because demand would fall below the available supply, then the bidders activity will reflect its unreduced demand. Under the ascending clock auction format, the FCC
auction bidding system will not allow a bidder to reduce the quantity of blocks it demands in an individual product if the reduction would result in aggregate demand falling below or further below the available supply of blocks in the product.
189. OEA will retain the discretion to change the activity requirement percentage during the auction. The bidding system would announce any such change in advance of the round in which it would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to adjust their bidding strategies.
190. Contingent bidding limit.
Because a bidders eligibility for the next round is calculated based on the bidders demands as applied by the auction system during bid processing, a bidders eligibility may be reduced even if the bidder submitted bids with activity that exceeds the required activity for the round. This may occur, for example, if the bidder bids to reduce its demand in PEA X by two blocks with 10 bidding units each and bids to increase its demand by one block with 20 bidding units in PEA Y. If the bidders demand can only be reduced by one block in PEA X because there is only one block of excess demand, the increase in PEA Y cannot be applied, and absent other bidding activity the bidders eligibility would be reduced.
To help a bidder avoid potentially having its eligibility reduced as a result of submitted bids that could not be applied during bid processing, as proposed, OEA and WTB adopt procedures to allow a bidder to submit bids with associated bidding activity greater than its current bidding eligibility. For example, depending upon the bidders overall bidding eligibility and the contingent bidding percentage, a bidder could submit an additional bid or bids that would be considered in price point order with its other bids and applied as available
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Federal Register - June 23, 2021

TitoloFederal Register

PaeseStati Uniti

Data23/06/2021

Conteggio pagine369

Numero di edizioni7802

Prima edizione14/03/1936

Ultima edizione25/06/2026

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