Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea del 17/3/2022 - Comunicaciones e Informaciones
Versione di testo Cosa è?Dateas è un sito indipendente non affiliato a entità governative. La fonte dei documenti PDF che pubblichiamo qui è l'entità governativa indicata in ciascuno di essi. Le versioni in testo sono trascrizioni che realizziamo per facilitare l'accesso e la ricerca di informazioni, ma possono contenere errori o non essere complete.
Source: Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea - Comunicaciones e Informaciones
C 122/2
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
17.3.2022
3
Vulnerabilities relating to residential real estate RRE can be a source of systemic risk and they may affect financial stability both directly and indirectly. Direct effects are credit losses on mortgage portfolios due to adverse economic or financial conditions and simultaneous negative developments in the RRE market. Indirect effects could be related to adjustments in household consumption or deleveraging by lenders, leading to further consequences for the real economy and financial stability.
4
As noted in recital 4 of Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board 3, the ultimate objective of macroprudential policy is to contribute to safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth.
5
To this end, macroprudential authorities may use one or more of the capital-based macroprudential measures set out in Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 4 and Regulation EU No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 5, and/or borrower-based macroprudential measures, which are exclusively based on national law, depending on the assessment of risks. While the capital-based measures are primarily aimed at increasing the resilience of the financial system, the borrower-based measures may be particularly suitable for preventing the further build-up of systemic risks in relation to new housing loans.
6
In 2019, the European Systemic Risk Board ESRB conducted a systematic and forward-looking European Economic Area EEA-wide assessment of vulnerabilities relating to RRE 6. This assessment enabled the ESRB to identify a number of medium-term vulnerabilities in several countries as sources of systemic risk to financial stability, which led to the issuance of warnings to five countries, including Germany 7.
7
In 2019, the main vulnerabilities identified in the RRE market in Germany were the significant overvaluation of house prices in urban areas, associated with widespread and rapid house price dynamics and some indication of a loosening of lending standards for housing loans, albeit in the context of the overall uncertainty due to significant data gaps.
8
The ESRB has recently concluded a further systematic and forward-looking EEA-wide assessment of vulnerabilities relating to RRE. The results of this assessment show that after receiving country-specific warnings in September 2019, some of the countries have taken further action to remedy the related vulnerabilities. In particular, Czech Republic adopted a legal framework for borrower-based measures, Germany established a legal basis for collection of data on lending standards of new housing loans to households, France activated limits on debt service-to-income DSTI ratios, Iceland tightened the limits on loan-to-value LTV ratios, and Norway tightened the rate of its systemic risk buffer. However, given the increasing vulnerabilities, the actions adopted by some of the countries were not considered sufficient according to the ESRB assessment.
9
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the related crisis have not led to a cyclical decline in housing markets. Rather, following a period of gradual growth, and amidst the low interest rate environment, real house price and lending growth have accelerated further in several countries, largely outpacing the growth in household income.
In order to mitigate the impact of the pandemic and the resulting economic uncertainty, various measures and policies, such as moratoria and public guarantees, have been implemented. In this broad policy context, previously scheduled macroprudential measures have been temporarily relaxed or their activation delayed in some countries.
The currently observed improvement in the economic situation allows for an adjustment of macroprudential policy in those countries in which RRE related vulnerabilities have continued to build up.
3 Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1.
4 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC
and 2006/49/EC OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.
5 Regulation EU No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and amending Regulation EU No 648/2012 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1.
6 See Vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors of the EEA countries, ESRB, September 2019, available on the ESRB website at www.esrb.europa.eu.
7 Warning ESRB/2019/11 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 27 June 2019 on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector in Germany OJ C 366, 30.10.2019, p. 45.
