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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 228 / Wednesday, December 1, 2021 / Proposed Rules
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percentage, and the number of acceptable bid amounts during the auction if it determines, consistent with past practice, that circumstances so dictate. OEA and MB propose to retain the discretion to do so on a construction permit-by-construction permit basis.
OEA and MB also propose to retain the discretion to limit a the amount by which a minimum acceptable bid for a construction permit may increase compared with the corresponding provisionally winning bid, and b the amount by which an additional bid amount may increase compared with the immediately preceding acceptable bid amount. For example a $1,000 limit could be set on increases in minimum acceptable bid amounts over provisionally winning bids. In this example, if calculating a minimum acceptable bid using the minimum acceptable bid increment percentage results in a minimum acceptable bid amount that is $1,200 higher than the provisionally winning bid on a construction permit, the minimum acceptable bid amount would instead be capped at $1,000 above the provisionally winning bid. OEA and MB
seek comment on the circumstances under which such a limit should be employed, factors that should be considered when determining the dollar amount of the limit, and the tradeoffs in setting such a limit or changing other parameters, such as changing the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the bid increment percentage, or the number of acceptable bid amounts. If OEA and MB exercise this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement in the FCC auction bidding system during the auction.
44. OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals. If commenters disagree with the proposal to begin the auction with nine acceptable bid amounts per construction permit, they should suggest an alternative number of acceptable bid amounts to use.
Commenters may wish to address the role of the minimum acceptable bids and the number of acceptable bid amounts in managing the pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by changing the bidding schedule, activity requirement, bid amounts, or by using other means.
H. Provisionally Winning Bids 45. Under the proposed simultaneous multiple-round auction format, the FCC
auction bidding system would determine provisionally winning bids consistent with practice in past auctions. At the end of a bidding round, the bidding system would determine a provisionally winning bid for each
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construction permit based on the highest bid amount received for that permit. The FCC auction bidding system would advise bidders of the status of their bids when round results are released. A provisionally winning bid would remain the provisionally winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same construction permit at the close of a subsequent round, unless the provisionally winning bid is withdrawn if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction. Provisionally winning bids at the end of the auction would become the winning bids. As a reminder, provisionally winning bids count toward activity for purposes of the activity rule.
46. The FCC auction bidding system assigns a pseudo-random number generated by an algorithm to each bid when the bid is entered. If identical high bid amounts are submitted on a construction permit in any given round i.e., tied bids, the FCC auction bidding system will use these pseudo-random generated numbers to select a single provisionally winning bid from among the tied bids. The tied bid with the highest pseudo-random number wins the tiebreaker and becomes the provisionally winning bid. The remaining bidders, as well as the provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other bids being placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the provisionally winning bid. If the construction permit receives any bids in a subsequent round, the provisionally winning bid again will be determined by the highest bid amount received for the construction permit.
I. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal 47. Bid Removal. The FCC auction bidding system allows each bidder to remove any of the bids it placed in a round before the close of that round. By removing a bid placed within a round, a bidder effectively unsubmits the bid. In contrast to the bid withdrawal provisions described below, a bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. Consistent with the design of the bidding system, OEA and MB propose that bidders in Auction 112 would be permitted to remove bids placed in a round before the close of that round.
48. Bid Withdrawal. OEA and MB
propose not to permit bidders in Auction 112 to withdraw bids. When permitted in an auction, bid withdrawals provide a bidder with the option of withdrawing bids placed in
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prior rounds that have become provisionally winning bids. A bidder would be able to withdraw its provisionally winning bids using the withdraw function in the FCC auction bidding system. A bidder that withdraws its provisionally winning bids, if permitted, is subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commissions rules.
49. The Commission has recognized that bid withdrawals may be a helpful tool in certain circumstances for bidders seeking to efficiently aggregate products or implement backup strategies. The Commission has also acknowledged that allowing bid withdrawals may encourage insincere bidding or increased opportunities for undesirable strategic bidding in certain circumstances. The Commission stated that this discretion should be exercised assertively, consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if they find a bidder is abusing the Commissions bid withdrawal procedures. In managing the auction, therefore, OEA and MB have discretion to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent bidding abuses.
50. Based on this guidance and on experience with past auctions of broadcast construction permits, OEA
and MB propose to prohibit bidders from withdrawing any bid after the close of the round in which that bid was placed. OEA and MB make this proposal in light of the site-specific nature and wide geographic dispersion of the permits available in this auction, which suggest that potential applicants for this auction may have fewer incentives to aggregate permits through the auction process as compared with bidders in many auctions of wireless licenses.
Thus, OEA and MB believe that it is unlikely that bidders will have a need to withdraw bids in this auction.
Further, OEA and MB are mindful that bid withdrawals, particularly if they were made late in this auction, could result in delays in licensing new broadcast stations and attendant delays in the offering of new broadcast service to the public. OEA and MB seek comment on the proposal to prohibit bid withdrawals in Auction 112.
Commenters advocating alternative approaches should support their arguments by taking into account the construction permits offered, the impact of auction dynamics and the pricing mechanism, and the effects on the bidding strategies of other bidders.

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