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lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 228 / Wednesday, December 1, 2021 / Proposed Rules discourage unproductive and anticompetitive strategic behavior.
Accordingly, if this proposal is adopted, OEA and MB will not identify bidders placing particular bids until after the bidding has closed. While OEA and MB
generally make available to the public information provided in each applicants FCC Form 175 following an initial review by Commission staff, OEA
and MB propose to not make public until after bidding has closed: 1 The permits that an applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application, 2
the amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant, 3
any applicants bidding eligibility, and 4 any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid.
Similarly, this nonpublic information may not be communicated from one applicant to another. 47 CFR
1.2105c1 provides that, subject to specified exceptions, all applicants are prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to, or communicating with or disclosing to each other in any manner, the substance of their own, or each others, or any other applicants bids or bidding strategies including post-auction market structure, or discussing or negotiating settlement agreements, until after the deadline for winning bidders to submit down payments. Applicant is defined as including all officers and directors of the entity submitting a short form application to participate in the auction, all controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest amounting to 10% or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form application. A party that submits an application becomes an applicant under the rule at the application filing deadline and that status does not change based on later developments.
8. Under this proposal, OEA and MB
would not make public any real-time information on bidding activity until the close of the auction. However, bidders would have access to additional information related to their own bidding and bid eligibility before and during the auction via the FCC auction bidding system.
9. Under this proposal, after the close of bidding, bidders permit selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other biddingrelated information would be made publicly available.
10. OEA and MB seek comment on the above details of the proposal for
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implementing limited information procedures, or anonymous bidding, in Auction 112. Commenters opposing the use of limited information procedures in Auction 112 should explain their reasoning and propose alternative information rules.
C. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility 11. In keeping with the usual practice in spectrum auctions, OEA and MB
propose that applicants be required to submit upfront payments as a prerequisite to becoming qualified to bid. An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by an applicant to establish its eligibility to bid on construction permits. Upfront payments that are related to the specific construction permits being auctioned protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of bidding.
12. OEA and MB seek comment on an appropriate upfront payment for each construction permit being auctioned, taking into account such factors as the efficiency of the auction process and the potential value of similar construction permits. With these considerations in mind, OEA and MB propose the upfront payments set forth in Attachment A to the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice and seek comment on those proposed upfront payment amounts.
13. OEA and MB further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by an applicant will determine its initial bidding eligibility in bidding units, which are a measure of bidder eligibility and bidding activity. OEA and MB propose to assign each construction permit a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per one thousand dollars of the upfront payment listed in Attachment A to the Auction 112
Comment Public Notice. The number of bidding units for a given construction permit is fixed and does not change during the auction as prices change. If an applicant is found to be qualified to bid on more than one permit being offered in Auction 112, such bidder may place bids on multiple construction permits, provided that the total number of bidding units associated with those construction permits does not exceed that bidders current eligibility. A
bidder cannot increase its eligibility during the auction; it can only maintain or decrease its eligibility. In calculating its upfront payment amount and hence its initial bidding eligibility, an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it
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may wish to bid or hold provisionally winning bids in any single round and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of bidding units. OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals.
D. Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices 14. As part of the pre-bidding process for each auction, OEA and MB seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and/or reserve price, as mandated by section 309j of the Act. OEA and MB propose to establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 112. Based on their experience in past broadcast auctions, OEA and MB have found that setting a minimum opening bid amount judiciously is an effective bidding tool for accelerating the competitive bidding process. In the most recent television broadcast auctionsfor low power television LPTV construction permits Auctions 104 and 111OEA and MB
have similarly proposed establishing minimum opening bids but not reserve prices; in those auctions, no comments opposed the proposal, and OEA and MB
adopted it both times. Based on these facts, OEA and MB propose establishing minimum opening bids for Auction 112.
OEA and MB do not propose to establish separate reserve prices for any of the construction permits to be offered in Auction 112, nor do OEA and MB see any reason to propose an aggregate reserve price for this auction.
15. For auctions of broadcast permits, OEA and MB generally propose minimum opening bid amounts that have been determined by taking into account the type of service and class of facility offered, market size, population covered by the proposed broadcast facility, and recent broadcast transaction data, to the extent such information is available. OEA and MB seek comment on the proposed minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 112, which are specified in Attachment A to this Auction 112 Comment Public Notice.
16. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts will result in unsold construction permits or are not reasonable amounts at which to start bidding, they should explain why this is so and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters should support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested amounts or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bid amounts, OEA and MB particularly seek comment on factors that could reasonably have an impact on bidders valuation of the broadcast spectrum, including the type of service and class
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