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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 208 / Monday, November 1, 2021 / Proposed Rules
telephone numbers could be disseminated, either intentionally or unintentionally, as part of that process e.g., through carelessness or malicious hacking? What security measures should the Commission consider to ensure that parties that obtain such sensitive data institute appropriate measures to prevent data breaches?
What types of data security requirements might be appropriate?
Should any such mechanisms relied upon to protect PSAP telephone numbers from unauthorized access or disclosure be adaptable to address data security issues? If so, would they need to be adaptable in real time or near-real time? How would such adaptation be effectuated as a practical matter?
18. Consistent with section 6507b1, the Commissions rules permit, but do not require, PSAPs to register any PSAP telephone numbers associated with the provision of emergency services or communications with other public safety agencies. See 47 CFR
64.1202b. Does the discretion afforded to PSAPs to decide which, if any, of their telephone numbers that they wish to place on the registry allow PSAPs to decide for themselves whether the benefits outweigh the risks of submitting numbers to the registry?
How should this impact the Commissions review of the security risks of a PSAP Do-Not-Call registry?
Can PSAPs, for example, decide to register only those numbers for which they determine that the protections from unwanted calls outweigh the potential harms from denial-of-service attacks? Do PSAPs have sufficient information to understand the protections and risks afforded by the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry, including an understanding of the types of dialing equipment that would be prohibited from calling those numbers under the TCPAs definition of an autodialer? Should the Commission conduct outreach to ensure that PSAPs are aware of the potential benefits and risks of submitting their numbers for inclusion on the registry?
Conversely, if PSAPs decline to register their numbers due to the security risk, would that undermine the effectiveness of the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry? What security protections, if any, would be necessary to reassure PSAPs that the benefits of participating in the registry outweigh the risks? The Commission invites commenters to provide information on the costs and benefits of any proposed security protections.
E. Alternative Technical and Regulatory Solutions 19. Other Technological Solutions.
Are there other technological solutions
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beyond the Commissions call blocking proposal that may have emerged in the near decade since section 6507 became law that the Commission might explore to protect PSAPs from unwanted calls while fulfilling the statutes requirements? For example, could the Commission require callers to filter their autodialed calls through a hardware or software platform that would house an encrypted list of registered PSAP
numbers and would be able to block autodialing equipment from making calls to these numbers? Do such technologies exist, and would it be cost effective and technologically feasible to implement such a solution? If such a technological solution does not currently exist, what steps would be needed to develop such technology and what entity or entities might be best suited to do so? What costs would be involved in terms of time and money to develop such a technological fix?
20. How long might it take to identify, develop, and implement any such alternative solution to a PSAP Do-NotCall registry? What would it cost to create such a solution? Who would maintain the list of telephone numbers housed in such a technological solution, and how often would the technology be updated or would callers be required to install updates? Are there risks that legitimate emergency calls might be blocked if such a system were implemented? Are there other viable alternative technological options that the Commission should consider that satisfy the specific statutory requirements and objectives of section 6507? Alternatively, should the Commission consider certain options even if they do not satisfy section 6507
in and of themselvesthat the Commission could adopt in addition to measures that do satisfy section 6507?
21. Security solutions exist today that can block calls to PSAPs that are determined to be fraudulent. These solutions become more effective when used in combination with STIR/
SHAKEN. Is call blocking at the PSAP
a more effective solution? Can PSAPs deploy the same blocking solutions that are used for consumers, or are more specialized solutions required? If blocking is to be based, at least in part, on information produced by STIR/
SHAKEN, what information should the terminating provider disseminate to the PSAP to make this determination? If more specialized solutions are required, how do these tools differ from consumer blocking tools? Would the need for PSAPs to deploy this solution place additional technical complexity and/or additional financial burden on PSAPs, and if so, how could this be mitigated?

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Which type of solutions can be deployed on a wide scale?
22. Apart from provider blocking, do PSAPs themselves have an ability to effectively block unwanted calls? If not, how long would it take and how much would it cost to implement such a blocking solution? Would requiring every autodialed call to identify itself as an automated call using the caller ID
information allow PSAPs to block these calls more effectively? Are there any best practices that PSAPs might implement to protect themselves from robocalls? For example, the Hospital Robocall Protection Group has issued a report outlining best practices that hospitals can use to protect hospitals against robocalls. Should the Commission consider outlining similar best practices for PSAPs? If so, what is the best method for doing so? For instance, should the Commission seek input from an existing or new advisory committee?
23. National Do-Not-Call Registry.
Could the Commission utilize the existing National Do-Not-Call Registry, working in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission FTC, to protect PSAPs from unwanted calls? The National Do-Not-Call Registry is administered by the FTC and has been operational for almost two decades and currently protects over 240 million telephone numbers from telemarketing sales calls, or telephone solicitations.
Would allowing PSAPs to register their telephone numbers on the National DoNot-Call Registry afford them a more timely, cost-effective, and secure solution to stop many unwanted calls while shielding the identity of the relatively small number of PSAP
numbers by including them among the hundreds of millions of other telephone numbers already contained in that registry? Could this approach, in conjunction with the TCPAs existing protection from autodialed calls to emergency telephone lines, satisfy the goals of section 6507 while providing reasonable security safeguards that preclude parties from identifying those telephone numbers associated with PSAPs and using them for malicious purposes? See 47 U.S.C. 227b1A.
Could the Commission work with the FTC to ensure this solution could be implemented in a timely manner?
24. Would this approach require Congress to revisit the statutory language associated with the Tax Relief Act and the TCPA to permit the Commission to implement this solution?
This might include authorizing the inclusion of PSAP telephone numbers on a registry currently reserved for residential telephone subscribers, and
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