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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 109 / Wednesday, June 9, 2021 / Proposed Rules
unlawful robocalls with the harm of shortening the extension for those providers least likely to do so? Would a lower enterprise revenue threshold such as 25 percent ensure we capture all small voice service providers likely to originate a large number of illegal robocalls while placing a limited burden on other small voice service providers?
29. In determining a voice service providers share of non-mass market revenue, we seek comment on whether it would be more appropriate to measure revenue from non-mass market customers, non-mass market services, or a combination of the two. For example, should we only measure revenue from non-mass market services attributable to non-mass-market customers or attributable to all customers? The Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order barred voice service providers from imposing line item charges for STIR/SHAKEN
implementation on consumer subscribers defined as residential mass-market subscribers and small business customer subscribers. In doing so, it defined mass market services as services marketed and sold on a standardized basis to residential customers, small businesses and other end-user customers. Should we adopt these definitions to measure mass market revenue so that if a small voice service providers mass-market revenue was less than 50 percent of total revenue, it would meet our proposed revenue criterion? Should we instead adopt a slightly different definition of mass-market customer or service from proceedings where we examined voice product markets? Would another definition be appropriate?
30. Other Alternative or Additional Criteria. We also seek comment on adopting criteria other than, or in addition to, calls per line and/or revenue to determine when a small voice service provider is particularly likely to be the source of unlawful robocalls. Should we shorten the extension for those small voice service providers that offer certain service features to customers commonly used for unlawful robocalls, such as the ability to display any number in the called partys caller ID, or to upload and broadcast a prerecorded message?
Should we shorten the extension for small voice service providers that offer specific implementations of customized caller ID display, such as area code or neighborhood spoofing i.e., spoofing the area code or NXX of the called party? Should we curtail the extension for those small voice service providers that offer customers autodialing functionality or whose call durations are
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very short? If so, what should that duration be? For example, ZipDX
argues that if originating call duration is less than 120 seconds on average, 15
percent of calls are less than 30 seconds and 50 percent of calls are less than 60
seconds, it is likely that such traffic is coming from an autodialer, and asserts that the legitimate situations where auto-dialed calls would come from foreign sources using USA telephone numbers are limited.
31. Is the relative proportion of originating to terminating traffic, and not just the absolute level of originating traffic, relevant to whether a voice service provider is likely to be originating unlawful robocalls? If so, should we shorten the extension for small voice service providers that have a certain ratio of originating to terminating traffic? If so, what should that ratio be?
32. Are all-IP small voice service providers more likely to be the source of unwanted robocalls? If so, should we curtail the extension for all-IP small voice service providers, particularly if their STIR/SHAKEN implementation costs are lower? How would we define all-IP under this approach? How should we prevent voice service providers from gaming such a definition by retaining a small TDM network or a TDM network element?
33. Should we shorten the extension for possible or actual violations of our rules or the law? How would we implement such a standard during the pendency of the extension period?
Should we curtail the extension for any small voice service providers on the redlight list, which lists entities that are delinquent in debts owed to the Commission? Should we curtail the extension for small voice service providers subject to a federal agency action or letter related to the origination or transmission of unlawful calls? For example, should we authorize the Enforcement Bureau to curtail the extension for small voice service providers it notifies of illegal traffic under our rules? The two-year extension relates to the duties of voice service providers as the originators of traffic, but a number of providers have been subject to inquiries and enforcement actions in their role as gateway or intermediate providers. We seek comment on whether these kinds of inquiries and enforcement actions should bear on a small voice service providers extension length, and whether that should extend to enforcement associated with traffic the provider merely transmitted and did not originate. Should we shorten the extension for those small voice service
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providers that the Commission, in consultation with the Industry Traceback Group, has determined are uncooperative or subject to a certain threshold number of traceback requests?
How would we implement such an approach? For example, should the Industry Traceback Group provide the Commission with a list of providers that meet this criterion by a date certain?
34. Are voice service providers with a higher revenue per customer more likely to be the source of unlawful robocalls? If so, should we adopt a definition, or a prong of a definition, based on revenue per customer? If so, what should the threshold be? Should we examine small voice service providers with relatively high percentages of revenue in certain categories on their FCC Form 499 or similar submissions to the Commission?
Are high levels of interstate, international, or toll revenue compared to total revenues indicative of small voice service providers likely to be the source of unlawful robocalls?
35. Should a certain class or classes of voice service providers that are unlikely to originate robocalls retain the two-year extension while we eliminate the extension for all other classes? For example, should only small voice service providers that are also rural local exchange carriers retain a two year extension on the basis that such providers are generally not involved in illegal robocalling? Should only those rural local exchange carriers that do not offer services typically used by illegal robocallers retain a two-year extension?
Are there other classes of providers that are unlikely to originate illegal robocalls and should therefore retain a two-year extension? For example, are providers that offer voice service over physical lines to end-user customers less likely to engage in illegal robocalling and if so, should they retain the two-year extension?
36. We seek comment generally on whether small voice service providers track the information for the definitional criteria that we may adopt. For example, do voice service providers retain and track revenue and calls-per-line data?
Can the Commission rely on data voice service providers track and submit for other purposes? Could we rely on revenue data from FCC Form 499 and line count information from FCC Form 477 to measure revenue or line-countrelated criteria by market segment? If voice service providers do not track data necessary to determine whether they fall within the criteria we adopt, would it be overly burdensome for them to begin to track this data solely for the purpose of
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