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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 109 / Wednesday, June 9, 2021 / Proposed Rules
II. Background 2. In March 2020, the Commission adopted rules requiring voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN
in the internet Protocol IP portions of their voice networks by June 30, 2021.
The STIR/SHAKEN framework relies on public-key cryptography to securely transmit the information that the originating voice service provider knows about the identity of the caller and its relationship to the phone number it is using throughout the entire length of the call path, allowing the terminating voice service provider to verify the information on the other end.
To implement STIR/SHAKEN in its network, a voice service provider must update portions of its network infrastructure to enable it to authenticate and verify caller ID
information consistent with the framework.
3. Widespread implementation of STIR/SHAKEN will provide numerous benefits for voice service providers, their subscribers, and entities involved in enforcement. Because STIR/SHAKEN
utilizes a three-level attestation to signify what a voice service provider knows about the calling party, it provides vital information that can be used by terminating voice service providers to block or label illegal robocalls before those calls reach their subscribers. Indeed, the Commission safe harbor for voice service providers that offer opt-out call blocking requires that providers base their blocking decisions on reasonable analytics that take into consideration caller ID
authentication information. STIR/
SHAKEN information also promotes enforcement by appending information about the source of a call into the metadata of the call itself, offering instantaneous traceback without the need to go through the traceback process. STIR/SHAKEN implementation further restores trust in caller ID
information and makes call recipients more willing to answer the phone, reduces disruption to E911 networks, reduces providers compliance response costs, and reduces the government-wide costs of enforcement. In total, the Commission estimated that the monetary benefit from reducing fraud and nuisance due to illegal robocalls would exceed $13.5 billion per year.
4. The TRACED Act created a process by which the Commission could grant extensions of the June 30, 2021, implementation deadline for voice service providers that the Commission determined face undue hardship in implementing STIR/SHAKEN. After assessing the burdens and barriers faced
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by different classes of voice service providers, the Commission granted the following class-based extensions: 1 A
two-year extension to small voice service providers; 2 an extension to voice service providers that cannot obtain a certificate until such provider is able to obtain one; 3 a oneyear extension to services scheduled for section 214 discontinuance; and 4 a continuing extension for the parts of a voice service providers network that rely on technology that cannot initiate, maintain, and terminate SIP calls until a solution for such calls is readily available. Voice service providers seeking the benefit of one of these extensions must implement a robocall mitigation program and, under new rules adopted in the Call Blocking Fourth Report and Order, all voice service providers must comply with requirements to respond fully and in a timely manner to all traceback requests from certain entities, effectively mitigate illegal traffic when notified by the Commission, and adopt affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing customers from using their network to originate illegal calls.
5. The Commission defined small voice service providers subject to an extension as those with 100,000 or fewer voice subscriber lines. It determined that an extension for small voice service providers until June 30, 2023, was appropriate because of their high implementation costs compared to their revenues, the limited STIR/
SHAKEN vendor offerings available to them, the likelihood that costs will decline over time, and because an extension will allow small voice service providers to spread the costs over time.
In adopting a blanket extension for small voice service providers, the Commission rejected arguments that not all voice service providers face identical hardships and that some of these providers may originate illegal robocalls. It determined that all small voice service providers, as a class, face undue hardship and thus a blanket extension for such providers is necessary to give them time to implement STIR/SHAKEN. The Commission also determined the extension would not unduly undermine the effectiveness of STIR/SHAKEN
because small voice service providers must still implement robocall mitigation programs and small voice service providers serve only a small percentage of total voice subscribers, thus limiting potential consumer harm of an extension.
6. Following circulation of the Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, but before its adoption,
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USTelecom proposed excluding from the definition of small voice service provider for purposes of this extension voice service providers that originate a disproportionate amount of traffic relative to their subscriber base, namely providers that serve enterprises and other heavy callers through their IP
networks. USTelecom noted that some of these voice service providers serve customers that often are responsible for illegal robocalls. Specifically, USTelecom suggested we exclude those small voice service providers that either 1 receive more than half their revenue from customers purchasing services that are not mass-market services or 2
originate more than 500 calls per day for any single line in the normal course of business. USTelecom noted that given the amount of traffic they originate, those providers should implement STIR/SHAKEN in a timely manner consistent with the goal of ubiquitous call authentication deployment and that providers serving these types of customers are unlikely to have the same resource constraints the Commission cited in adopting the extension. The Commission declined to adopt USTelecoms proposal at the time but left open the possibility that it might reevaluate it in the future. The Commission acknowledged that it saw value in the policy goals that underlie USTelecoms request, but concluded that implementing the proposal would require a difficult-line drawing exercise and that it was not able to identify criteria in the limited time available before adoption in which we have confidence. The Commission stated, however, that it was open to revisiting this issue should we determine that the extension creates an unreasonable risk of unsigned calls from a specific subset of small voice service providers.
III. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 7. With additional time to consider the issue and new evidence indicating that certain small voice service providers are originating a high and increasing share of illegal robocalls relative to their subscriber base, we now propose to reassess the Commissions earlier determination that all small voice service providers should receive a two-year extension. Specifically, we propose to shorten by one year the extension for small voice service providers that originate an especially large number of calls, so that such providers must implement STIR/
SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks no later than June 30, 2022.

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