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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules
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OEA to change the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors. The large number of licenses available in the 2.5 GHz band implies that the SMR
format could involve a large number of bidding rounds, potentially lasting several months. The Commission seeks comment on this approach. Commenters on this issue should address the role of the bidding schedule in managing the pace of the auction, specifically discussing the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by bidding schedule changes, by changing the activity requirements or bid amount parameters, or by using other means.
2. Stopping Rule 69. The Commission has discretion to establish stopping rules before or during multiple-round auctions in order to complete the auction within a reasonable time. Under this SMR
auction format, the Commission would employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach, which means all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding stops on every license.
Specifically, bidding would close on all licenses after the first round in which no bidder submits any new bids, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bids if bid withdrawals are permitted.
Provisionally winning bids are bids that would become final winning bids if the auction were to close in that given round. Under this simultaneous stopping rule, bidding would remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license. Consequently, under this approach, it is not possible to determine in advance precisely how long the bidding in Auction 108 would last.
70. Further, OEA would retain the discretion to exercise any of the following stopping options during Auction 108:
Option 1. The auction would close for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws a provisionally winning bid if withdrawals are permitted in Auction 108, or no bidder places any new bid on a license for which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule.
Option 2. The auction would close for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, no
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bidder withdraws a provisionally winning bid if withdrawals are permitted in Auction 108, or no bidder places any new bid on a license that already has a provisionally winning bid.
Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on an FCCheld license a license that does not have a provisionally winning bid would not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule.
Option 3. The auction would close using a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that combines Option 1 and Option 2 above.
Option 4. The auction would close after a specified number of additional rounds special stopping rule to be announced by OEA. If OEA invokes this special stopping rule, it would accept bids in the specified final rounds, after which the auction would close.
Option 5. The auction would remain open even if no bidder places any new bid, applies a waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bids if withdrawals are permitted in Auction 108. In this event, the effect would be the same as if a bidder had applied a waiver. The activity rule would apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity would lose bidding eligibility or use a waiver.
71. Under the SMR format, OEA
would exercise these options only in certain circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding unusually slowly or quickly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time or will close prematurely. Before exercising these options, OEA would likely attempt to change the pace of Auction 108. For example, OEA could adjust the pace of bidding by changing the number of bidding rounds per day and/or the minimum acceptable bids.
Under this approach, OEA would retain continuing discretion to exercise any of these options with or without prior announcement by OEA during the auction. The Commission seeks comment on these procedures.
3. Activity Rule 72. In order to avoid unduly prolonging the length of the auction, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before participating. The bidding system calculates a bidders activity in a round as the sum of the bidding units associated with any licenses upon which it places bids during the current round and the bidding units associated with any licenses for which it holds provisionally winning bids. Bidders are
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required to be active on a specific percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidders eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidders ability to place additional bids in the auction.
73. Under an SMR auction format, the Commission would consider dividing the auction into at least two stages, each characterized by a different activity requirement. For example, in a first stage, bidders could be required to be active on 80% of their bidding units, while in a later stage, they could be required to be active on 95% of their bidding units. The Commission would also consider conducting the auction in a single stage, potentially with a 100%
activity requirement. If the Commission does not conduct a single stage, the auction would start in Stage One. OEA
would then have the discretion to advance the auction to another stage by announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the Commission anticipates that OEA
would consider a variety of measures of auction activity, including but not limited to, the length of the auction, the percentage of bidding units associated with licenses on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the increase in revenue. For example, when monitoring activity for determining when to change stages, OEA could consider the percentage of bidding units of the licenses receiving new provisionally winning bids, excluding any FCC-held licenses. In past auctions, OEA has generallybut not always changed stages when this measure was approximately 20% or below for three consecutive rounds of bidding. The Commission seeks comment on these procedures for activity requirements.
4. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility 74. For the SMR auction format, when a bidders activity in the current round is below the required minimum level, it could preserve its current level of eligibility through an activity rule waiver, if available. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding, not to a particular license.
Activity rule waivers can be either proactive or automatic. Activity rule waivers are primarily a mechanism for a bidder to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent it from bidding in a particular round.
75. Under an SMR auction format, each bidder in Auction 108 would be
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