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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 233 / Wednesday, December 8, 2021 / Proposed Rules have estimates for these costs, and they are not included in the estimates above.
FinCEN plans to identify noncompliance with BOI reporting requirements 164 by leveraging a variety of data sources, both internal and external. Because the external data sources may include third parties, FinCEN requests comment on what external data sources would be appropriate for FinCEN to leverage in identifying non-compliance with the BOI reporting requirements and what potential costs may be incurred by such third parties, particularly state, local, and Tribal authorities and financial institutions. If the external data sources include third party commercial data, FinCEN assesses that the cost associated with accessing these databases would be modest and incremental, given that FinCEN regularly maintains access to such databases but may need to request additional licenses for employees. After identifying non-compliance, FinCEN
may initiate outreach to the entity, work with law enforcement to investigate non-compliance, or initiate an enforcement action. FinCENs enforcement of the BOI reporting requirements would also involve coordination with law enforcement agencies. These law enforcement agencies may also incur costs time and resources while conducting investigations into non-compliance.
FinCEN anticipates that costs to law enforcement agencies that have access to the BOI data would be assessed in the BOI access regulations, and therefore is not estimating them here.
The proposed rule does not impose direct costs on state, local, and Tribal governments. However, state, local, and Tribal governments would incur indirect costs in connection with the implementation of the proposed rule.
For example, such governments would likely be the initial point of outreach for some companies with questions on how to comply with the reporting requirement. FinCEN anticipates taking measures to minimize the costs associated with such questions. These measures would include providing clear FinCEN guidance directly to the public on BOI reporting requirements, which may help to diminish the number of questions from the public. FinCEN
would also provide guidance materials to state, local, and Tribal governments that they could use and distribute in response to questions, which would minimize those governments need to 164 This would include identifying potential noncompliance with the proposed rule through reporting of false information or through failing to file an initial or updated report when required.

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develop their own guidance materials at their own cost. FinCEN received comments to the ANPRM which discussed such possible costs; they are summarized in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act section below. FinCEN
encourages additional comments that discuss, and if possible estimate, the costs to state, local and Tribal governments under the proposed rule.
ii. Benefits There are several potential benefits associated with this proposed rule.
These benefits are interrelated and likely include improved and more efficient investigations by law enforcement, U.S. financial institutions, and other authorized users, which in turn may strengthen national security, enhance financial system transparency and integrity, and align with international financial standards.
The U.S. 2018 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment NMLRA
estimates that domestic financial crime, excluding tax evasion, generates approximately $300 billion of proceeds for potential laundering.165 Criminal actors may use entities to send or receive funds, or otherwise assist in the money laundering process to legitimize the illegal funds. For example, an entity may act as a shell companywhich usually has no employees or operationsand hold assets to obscure the identity of the true owner, or act as a front company which generates legitimate business proceeds to commingle with illicit earnings. Tradebased money laundering, for example, often leverages such front companies.166
FinCEN is not able to provide estimates of the amount of proceeds that flow through money laundering schemes that use entities given lack of data,167 but 165 U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2018, p. 2, available at https home.treasury.gov/system/files/
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166 Id., p. 29. Trade-based money laundering involves a cycle of money brokers and exporters of goods to disguise and move illicit funds. The sale of the goods effectively launders the money and provides payment to illicit actors in local currency.
Merchants who receive payment for their goods may be unaware they are participating in a money laundering scheme, but some willingly accept such funds and are complicit. Id., p. 3.
167 For example, the Government Accountability Offices 2020 report on trade-based money laundering noted that specific estimates of the amount of such activity globally are unavailable, but it is likely one of the largest forms of money laundering. Government Accountability Office, Trade-based Money Laundering April 2020, p. 19,
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entities are frequently used in money laundering schemes and provide a layer of anonymity to the natural persons involved in such transactions.168
Identifying the owners of these entities is a crucial step to all parties that investigate money laundering. The NMLRA notes that, according to federal law enforcement agencies, misuse of entities poses a significant money laundering risk, and that law enforcement efforts to uncover the true owners of companies can be resourceintensive, especially when those ownership trails lead overseas or involve numerous layers of ownership.169 However, there is currently no systematic way to obtain information on the beneficial owners of entities in the United States.
The proposed rule is expected to help address the lack of BOI critical for money laundering investigations.
Improved visibility into the identities of the individuals who own or control entities may enhance law enforcements ability to investigate, prosecute, and disrupt the financing of international terrorism, other transnational security threats, and other types of domestic and transnational financial crime, when entities are used to engage in such activities. Other authorized users in the national security and intelligence fields would likewise be expected to benefit from the use of this data. The BOI
database may also increase investigative efficiency and thus decrease the cost to law enforcement of investigations that require or benefit from identifying the owners of entities. These anticipated benefits are supported by ANPRM
comments from those that represent the law enforcement community, some of whom expressed the opinion that the availability of BOI would provide law enforcement at every level with an important tool to investigate the misuse of shell companies and other entities used for criminal activity. To the extent these investigations may become more effective, money laundering in the United States may become more available at https www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20333.pdf.
168 Please see the discussion of this topic in the Background section of the preamble, which describes in greater detail the money laundering concerns with legal entities and disguised beneficial owners, as well as the Department of the Treasurys efforts to address the lack of transparency in legal entity ownership structures.
169 U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2018, p. 4, available at https home.treasury.gov/system/files/
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