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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 232 / Tuesday, December 7, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
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militant groups. Some of the weapons about which the FAA was concerned had the capability to target aircraft at higher altitudes or during approach and departure and had weapon ranges that could extend into the near offshore areas along Yemens coastline.
In the January 2016 final rule, the FAA also indicated that U.S. civil aviation was at risk from combat operations and other military-related activity associated with the fighting and instability in Yemen and that there was an ongoing threat of terrorism. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP
remained active in Yemen and had demonstrated the capability and intent to target U.S. and Western aviation interests. Various Yemeni airports had been attacked during the fighting, including Sanaa International Airport OYSN and Aden International Airport OYAA, resulting in instances of damage to airport facilities and temporary closure of those airports.
On December 14, 2017, the FAA
amended SFAR No. 115, 91.1611, to reduce the boundaries of its prohibition of U.S. civil aviation operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR
OYSC.2 Between January 2016 and December 2017, the situation in Yemen had slightly improved, as a coalition of Yemeni government forces, supporting nations, and allied militia elements successfully limited the area of opposition force control and reduced some of the opposition forces weapon capabilities. In December 2017, opposition elements in Yemen did not possess functional medium-/long-range strategic SAM capabilities. As a result, the FAA found there was a sufficiently reduced level of risk to U.S. civil aviation operations on certain international air routes that transit offshore areas of the Sanaa FIR OYSC
to permit U.S. civil aviation operations on those routes again. However, U.S.
civil aviation operations remained prohibited in the rest of the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR OYSC.
On December 11, 2019, after it again assessed the situation in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR OYSC, the FAA
determined the situation continued to be hazardous for U.S. civil aviation.3
Significant risk to U.S. civil aviation operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR OYSC continued to exist due to the ongoing conflict between the 2 Amendment of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in Specified Areas of the Sanaa OYSC
Flight Information Region final rule, 82 FR 58722
Dec. 14, 2017.
3 Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in Specified Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region FIR OYSC final rule, 84 FR
67659 Dec. 11, 2019.

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SLC and Iranian-aligned Houthi forces and an enduring extremist/militant threat to U.S. civil aviation operations in those areas. There had been multiple reported surface-to-air incidents, including successful shoot downs of military tactical and surveillance aircraft by Houthi forces armed with a variety of anti-aircraft-capable weapons.
With international assistance, Houthi elements had received or developed, and successfully employed, innovative anti-aircraft-capable weapons, ballistic missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems UAS capabilities. Various entities using multiple capabilities had attacked airports within the Sanaa FIR OYSC.
Additionally, extremist or militant elements continued to exploit the conflict for control of territory to launch attacks. As of December 2019, both AQAP and extremists aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham ISIS operated in Yemen. Both of these international extremist or militant organizations have a history of targeting U.S. interests, including civil aviation.
The FAA continued to assess that opposition elements in Yemen did not possess functional medium-/long-range strategic SAM capabilities and did not control territory from which surface to air weapons could reach air routes off the southern and western coasts of Yemen.
IV. Discussion of the Final Rule The FAA continues to assess the situation in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR OYSC as presenting significant, continuing safety-of-flight risks for U.S. civil aviation due to the ongoing conflict between the SLC and Iranian-aligned Houthi forces and the enduring extremist or militant threat to U.S. civil aviation operations in those areas. Houthi forces have continued to develop, acquire, and employ advanced weapons capabilities, including nontraditional air defense capabilities, UAS, and missile capabilities. Collectively, such capabilities pose risks to U.S. civil aviation operations at all altitudes in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR OYSC
and airports in Yemen.
Houthi forces operate multiple air defense systems capable of targeting aircraft at various altitudes. Notably, they have employed increasingly capable Iranian-supplied SAMs and electro-optical/infrared seeker E.O./IR
air-to-air AA missiles modified for use as SAMs to engage manned and unmanned military aircraft. In 2020, Houthi elements reportedly shot down multiple SLC tactical manned and unmanned aircraft operating in Yemeni airspace, including a Tornado fighter aircraft in February 2020 and an SLC

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UAS in December 2020. Houthi air defense capabilities pose an inadvertent risk to U.S. civil aviation operations due to the potential for misidentification or miscalculation by irregular forces using advanced air defense capabilities for which they may not have received adequate training and may not have adequate air surveillance information to distinguish accurately between civil aircraft and potential airborne threats.
The FAA continues to assess Houthi forces in Yemen do not possess functional medium-/long-range strategic SAM capabilities.
Additionally, Houthi elements have targeted international airports in the region using weaponized UAS, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. In December 2020, an attack on Aden International Airport OYAA occurred shortly after the arrival of a commercial aircraft from Saudi Arabia carrying senior members of the internationallyrecognized Government of Yemen.
Although some Houthi offensive weapons systems have range capabilities that would allow them to reach the limited areas of the Sanaa FIR
OYSC in which the FAA permits U.S.
civil aviation to operate, Houthi forces have not demonstrated an intent to conduct weaponized UAS or missile attacks in those areas. Instead, they have focused these types of attacks primarily on targets in Saudi Arabia and targets in contested areas of Yemen. In addition, Houthi weaponized UAS operations would only present a safety of flight hazard to civil aircraft operating off the Yemeni coast if such aircraft were operating below cruising altitudes.
Besides the safety-of-flight risks associated with the conflict between the SLC and Iranian-aligned Houthi forces, extremist or militant groups operating in Yemen likely have access to antiaircraft-capable weapons, including MANPADS, presenting a risk up to 25,000 feet. AQAP continues to operate in Yemen and historically has attempted to attack Western civil aviation through novel improvised explosive devices, including the 2009 failed underwear bombing attempt on a U.S.-bound flight and the 2010 printer cartridge plot targeting U.S.-bound cargo flights.
Additionally, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham ISIS cells remain active in Yemen.
As a result of the significant, continuing unacceptable risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR
OYSC described in this rule, the FAA
extends the expiration date of SFAR No.
115, 91.1611, from January 7, 2022, until January 7, 2025.

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