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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 213 / Monday, November 8, 2021 / Rules and Regulations collection points. Moreover, the purpose of a SORN is to provide notice to the public regarding personally identifiable information maintained by an agency; it is not meant to outline or provide a full description of the technical capabilities and nuances of an IT system. Granular detail of system connections, algorithmic processes, access controls, and auditing functions can be found in the applicable systems PIA, which can be found at www.dhs.gov/privacy. All PIAs link to their associated SORNs, providing clear notice as to which systems are covered under the Analytical Records SORN.

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The SORN Allows for ICE To Conduct Unlimited Surveillance and Predictive Policing Several commenters expressed concern with ICEs use of advanced analytics and artificial intelligence to engage in controversial policing tactics.
The first tactic, predictive policing, is the practice of using statistics and analysis to forecast crime or identify where crime may occur in the near future.1 Certain state or local police departments have used these methods to determine where to deploy resources or to identify those who are likely to commit crimes in the future by examining past behaviors.
The Analytical Records SORN does not support predictive policing. The SORN lists the purposes of the collection, use, and sharing of information in ICE analytical systems.
The purposes of the systems are to identify current violations of law and regulation or generate leads for ongoing investigations. There is no purpose stated in the SORN that allows for its systems to engage in future state risk modelling.
Commenters expressed concern with a second controversial policing tactic, ongoing and constant surveillance of immigrants and citizens. This is similarly not supported by the Analytical Records SORN. As stated in the SORN and above, the Analytical Records SORN does not expand ICE
collections of personal data. ICE
analytical systems ingest data that has already been collected through other efforts and authorities. The restrictions on use of that data are listed in the SORN relevant to that collection and are transferred to the ICE analytical systems for linkage and further analysis. ICE
analytical systems are meant to process data that has already been collected in 1 Tim Lau, Predictive Policing Explained April 1, 2020, available at https www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/research-reports/predictive-policingexplained.

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a more efficient manner using advanced analytics and modern processing techniques. They are not used to monitor or surveil the public.
The SORNs Routine Uses Are Overly Broad Finally, a commenter objected that the routine uses listed in the Analytical Records SORN are so expansive . . .
they provide no limit on permissible sharing. The commenter, unfortunately, has not articulated any specific routine use that is inconsistent with the Privacy Act or ICEs statutory authorities for ICE to address. Generally, however, any routine use listed in the SORN must be compatible with the purpose of the system of records, as stated in the SORN, the purpose for which ICE originally collected the information, and ICEs statutory mission. Each routine use is analyzed and vetted for compatibility by ICE and DHS. As the Analytical Records SORN
consolidates two previous ICE SORNs, the vast majority of routine uses in the new Analytical Records SORN are the same as the routine uses listed in those previously published SORNs. This means that the Analytical Records SORN routine uses were examined on multiple occasions by government oversight bodies that determined they were neither overly broad nor outside the stated purpose of the system of records.
As described in the SORN, if data is ingested from another system of records, the ICE analytical system, through record tagging and controls, ensures any subsequent sharing is compatible with the original SORNs purposes. This provides additional safeguards in the flow of information and limits the permissible sharing of data.
After consideration of public comments, the Department will implement the rulemaking as proposed.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS amends Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for part 5
continues to read as follows:

Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Pub. L.
107296, 116 Stat. 2135; 5 U.S.C. 301.
Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.

2. In appendix C to part 5, add paragraph 86 to read as follows:

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Appendix C to Part 5DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy Act

86. The DHS/ICE018 Analytical Records System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/ICE018 Analytical Records System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but not limited to the enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under;
national security and intelligence activities.
The DHS/ICE018 Analytical Records System of Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable information collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in 5
U.S.C. 552ac3 and 4, d, e1, e2 and 3, e4G, e4H, e4I, e5, e8;
f; and g pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552aj2.
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552ac3, d, e1, e4G, e4H, and f pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552ak2. Where a record received from another system has been exempted in that source system under 5 U.S.C. 552aj2, DHS will claim the same exemptions for those records that are claimed for the original primary systems of records from which they originated and claims any additional exemptions set forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
a From subsection c3 and 4
Accounting for Disclosures because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire investigative process.
b From subsection d Access and Amendment to Records because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to
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