Federal Register - October 19, 2021
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Source: Federal Register
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 199 / Tuesday, October 19, 2021 / Proposed Rules
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The minimum acceptable level of performance for the PEP is 90 percent or an improvement of 2 to 6 percentage points over the previous years level of performance. Section 409a8 of the Act and 45 CFR 305.61a2 impose automatic corrective action for the subsequent fiscal year. A state also must submit complete and reliable data used in the PEP calculation, which will be audited according to 45 CFR 305.60.
If a state fails to meet the annual 90
percent PEP standard, or to show improvement in the subsequent year 2
to 6 percentage points, the amount of the initial penalty will be equal to one percent of the adjusted State Family Assistance Grant for the TANF program.
A penalty against the TANF grant will also be imposed if the state fails to submit complete and reliable PEP data and there is an adverse data reliability audit finding for PEP in the subsequent year. The penalty will continue to be assessed in accordance with section 409a8B of the Act and 45 CFR
305.61 until the state is determined to have submitted complete and reliable data and achieved the required performance level. In accordance with 45 CFR 262.1e1, the state must expend additional state funds equal to the amount of the penalty which will not count toward the maintenance-ofeffort requirement under TANF the year after the TANF penalty is assessed.
In recent years prior to the pandemic, OCSE has imposed an average of one penalty for PEP performance annually, as nearly all states have consistently met or exceeded the PEP performance measure. This indicates that the failure in performance in FFY 2020 is due to the unprecedented circumstances of the PHE. In addition, in the last ten years, OCSE has imposed no penalties due to adverse data reliability audit findings related to the PEP measure.
Proposed PEP Penalty Relief OCSE proposes providing relief through this regulation by modifying the requirements related to the PEP
performance measure. Section 452g3
of the Act authorizes the Secretary to take into account such additional variables as the Secretary identifies including the percentage of children in a State who are born out of wedlock or for whom support has not been established that affect the ability of a State to meet the requirements of section 452g of the Act. OCSE
proposes that the effect of the COVID
19 PHE on states is one such additional variable, due to the unprecedented nature and scope of the pandemics impact on the child support program as described above. Therefore, OCSE
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proposes modifying the required PEP to a lower performance threshold and setting aside adverse data reliability audit findings related to PEP, thereby allowing states that are not able to meet data performance and data reliability audit requirements to avoid the financial penalty for the years when the pandemic had its greatest impact on the child support program.
OCSE proposes modifying the PEP
threshold of 90 percent to a lower threshold of 50 percent for FFYs 2020
and 2021. The rationale for choosing 50
percent is based on the value of this percentage in Table 1 under 45 CFR
305.33, Determination of applicable percentages based on performance levels. Fifty percent is the lowest possible PEP level in the table that still has performance value because it is the lowest PEP performance for which a state still gets credit in the calculation of incentives. Below 50 percent, the states applicable percentage for PEP
performance is valued at zero. In addition, we propose a 50 percent threshold because, according to OCSEs FFY 2020 data, no state has a FFY 2020
PEP level below 65 percent. Therefore, a PEP level of 50 percent will ensure that no state will be subject to a financial penalty while state agency operations are disrupted due to the ongoing PHE.
This proposed rule is time limited and data informed to provide relief narrowly and specifically in response to the ongoing PHE. We propose modifying the PEP threshold for FFYs 2020 and 2021 to align with the timeframe when states experienced the greatest impact of the public health emergency. After the relief period, starting for FFY 2022, the PEP performance thresholds will revert back to the usual levels described under 45 CFR 305.40a1, and states will once again be subject to penalties for adverse data reliability audit findings related to the PEP measure after an automatic corrective action year as specified in 45 CFR 305.42. In this NPRM, we specifically seek public comment on the timeframe for the relief proposed, and whether the relief period should extend to include FFY 2022.
Finally, this proposed relief maintains the integrity of the system of performance, audit, penalties, and incentives that has driven success and accountability in the child support program for over two decades. The proposed regulation provides relief from the PEP measure and data reliability audit penalties but does not otherwise change the process for other performance measures, data collection and reporting, audits, or incentives.
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Section-by-Section Discussion of the Provisions of This Proposed Rule Section 305.61: Penalty for Failure To Meet IVD Requirements.
We propose to add a new provision to Part 305 Program Performance Measures, Standards, Financial Incentives and Penalties, to provide short-term relief from financial penalties related to the paternity establishment percentage measure, due to the impact of the COVID19 pandemic on state IV
D operations. We propose adding a new paragraph e to 305.61, Penalty for failure to meet IVD requirements, to modify the criteria by which states are subject to financial penalties for the PEP
requirements. The proposed modified criteria are that the acceptable performance level of paternity establishment percentage under 305.40a1 is reduced from 90
percent to 50 percent and the adverse findings of data reliability audits of a states paternity establishment data under 305.60 will not result in a financial penalty. The proposed modifications are applicable to FFYs 2020 and 2021.
In summary, the rationale for this NPRM, which proposes modifying the PEP requirements, is based on the statutory allowance under section 452g3A of the Act that the Secretary may consider additional variables that affect a states ability to meet PEP
requirements due to the COVID19 PHE.
However, the proposed modifications are only for FFYs 2020 and 2021. In addition, the proposed modifications are based on data that indicate PEP
declined for 41 states during the pandemic, and approximately one third of states will be subject to a financial penalty related to these declines if they do not take sufficient corrective action in the subsequent corrective action year.
During this COVID19 PHE, OCSE has carefully considered the impact of the pandemic on state performance. The proposed regulation limits adding further burden on states by providing relief from penalties against state public assistance funding.
Paperwork Reduction Act No new information collection requirements are imposed by these regulations.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis The Secretary certifies that, under 5
U.S.C. 605b, as enacted by the Regulatory Flexibility Act Pub. L. 96
354, this rule will not result in a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The primary impact is on State governments. State
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