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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 155 / Monday, August 16, 2021 / Proposed Rules achieve a risk-based capital ratio numerator reflecting equity available to cover losses in the event of liquidation.
The Board, however, recognized that requiring the exclusion of goodwill and other intangibles associated with supervisory mergers and combinations of credit unions that occurred prior to the 2015 Final Rule could directly reduce a credit unions risk-based capital ratio. Accordingly, under the 2015 Final Rule, the Board also permitted credit unions to exclude certain goodwill and other intangible assets from the deduction in the riskbased capital ratio numerator. In particular, the 2015 Final Rule excluded from the definition of goodwill, which must be deducted from the risk-based capital ratio numerator, certain goodwill or other intangible assets acquired by a credit union in a supervisory merger or consolidation.
Under the 2015 Final Rule, excluded goodwill is defined as the outstanding balance, maintained in accordance with GAAP, of any goodwill originating from a supervisory merger or combination that was completed on or before December 28, 2015. This term and definition expire on January 1, 2029.
Excluded other intangible assets is defined as the outstanding balance, maintained in accordance with GAAP, of any other intangible assets such as core deposit intangible, member relationship intangible, or trade name intangible originating from a supervisory merger or combination that was completed on or before December 28, 2015. This term and definition expire on January 1, 2029. The Board added these two definitions to take into account the impact goodwill or other intangible assets recorded from transactions defined as supervisory mergers or combinations have on the calculation of the risk-based capital ratio upon implementation. Both definitions apply to supervisory mergers or combinations that occurred before December 28, 2015. The date, December 28, 2015, was 60 days after the 2015
Final Rule was published in the Federal Register, which provided sufficient notice to complex credit unions contemplating supervisory mergers at the time the 2015 Final Rule was issued.
The Board understands, however, that there is some confusion as to whether the dates were amended after the subsequent delays to the 2015 Final Rule in the 2018 Supplemental Rule and the 2019 Supplemental Rule. The Board notes that as currently written, the delays to the effective date of the 2015
Final Rule do not amend the December 28, 2015, date for excluded goodwill
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and other intangible assets. Any supervisory mergers that included goodwill and other intangible assets after December 28, 2015, are required deductions once the 2015 Final Rule becomes effective on January 1, 2022.
The Board, however, is open to considering an amendment to the 2015
Final Rule. Should the Board amend the December 28, 2015, date to alleviate any potential confusion in the date caused by the delayed effective date of the 2015
Final Rule? The Board also notes that the CCULR framework, as proposed, would not require a deduction, so any potential amendment would only be relevant for complex credit unions that are not qualifying complex credit unions or that have not opted to calculate their risk-based capital measure under the CCULR framework.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of deducting goodwill from regulatory capital under the 2015
Final Rule? As goodwill is not a tangible asset, how would not deducting goodwill from regulatory capital adequately protect the NCUSIF in the event of a failure and liquidation?
Question 6: Please comment on whether the Board should consider qualifying criteria for other categories of exposures that are subject to heightened risk weights under the 2015 Final Rule.
Should the Board combine several categories of higher risk-weighted exposures to ensure a complex credit unions aggregate exposure is under a certain threshold?
5. Other CBLR Eligibility Criteria Total Assets of Less Than $10 Billion Under the other banking agencies CBLR framework, only depository institutions or depository institution holding companies with total consolidated assets of less than $10
billion are eligible to use the CBLR. The $10 billion limitation was included in the EGRRCPA.61 The other banking agencies also stated that a risk-based capital ratio is more appropriate for larger banking organizations because such banking organizations may present risks that are not appropriately captured by the CBLR framework.62 Commenters to the ANPR that addressed the scope of eligible institutions generally favored not using the CBLR threshold of $10
billion. One commenter stated that because credit unions are generally subject to more stringent portfolio shaping regulations than banks, a $10
billion cap was not appropriate. One commenter stated that the NCUA could 61 Supra 62 Supra
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set a higher threshold of $15 billion or $20 billion to harmonize the CCULR
with the more granular stress testing tiers. Other non-credit union commenters favored a $10 billion limit on eligibility to opt into the CCULR
framework.
The Board is not proposing to include this qualifying criterion in the proposed rule. The Board believes that the CCULR
framework would appropriately capture the risk for all complex credit unions regardless of asset size. The FCUA
limits the types of assets a Federal credit union can hold compared to banking organizations. Consequently, larger banking organizations may be more likely to include assets that cannot be adequately risk weighted with a leverage ratio than a complex credit union. Therefore, the Board believes permitting all complex credit unions regardless of asset size to opt into the CCULR framework is prudent and does not present a risk to the NCUSIF.
Permitting credit unions with total assets over $10 billion would only include 18 additional credit unions, with total assets of over $438 billion, or 27 percent of all complex credit union assets as of March 31, 2021. In addition, these credit unions are highly capitalized and have an average net worth ratio of just under 10 percent.
Twelve of the eighteen credit unions have net worth ratios over nine percent.
The remaining six credit unions with total assets over $10 billion as of March 2021 have an average net worth ratio of 8.32 percent.
The Board notes that $10 billion is the threshold for credit unions to begin capital planning under part 702. In addition, complex credit unions with $20 billion or more in total assets are subject to stress testing requirements.63
These requirements are independent of the complex credit unions CCULR
selection. Therefore, a complex credit union that meets the applicable thresholds for capital planning and stress testing requirements will be subject to such requirements regardless of its CCULR opt in election.
Question 7: Should the Board consider limiting eligibility to the CCULR framework to only complex credit unions with less than $10 billion in total assets? The Board seeks comments on a potential $10 billion asset limitation and whether it is appropriate for the CCULR framework.
Question 8: In contrast to the other banking agencies CBLR statute and regulation, the Board is not proposing to include a qualifying criterion for mortgage servicing assets MSAs. As 63 12

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