Federal Register - August 5, 2021
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Source: Federal Register
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 148 / Thursday, August 5, 2021 / Proposed Rules 093AD, dated November 8, 2018
Emergency AD 20182352, which applies to all Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW169 and AW189 helicopters.
Emergency AD 20182352 requires inspecting the nut, cotter pin, lock-wire, and hinge bracket connected to the TRA
feedback lever link, and each connection of the TRA feedback lever link, and repair if necessary. Emergency AD 20182352 also requires applying a paint stripe or torque seal on the nut and reporting certain information. The FAA issued Emergency AD 20182352
to address failure of the TRA feedback lever. This condition could result in loss of tail rotor TR control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
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Actions Since AD 20182352 Was Issued Since the FAA issued Emergency AD
20182352, the agency determined certain inspections and checks of the TR
DB, installation of an improved TRA
and an improved TR DB, certain other actions, and applicable corrective actions are necessary to address the unsafe condition.
The EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD
20200197, dated September 10, 2020
EASA AD 20200197, to correct an unsafe condition for all Leonardo S.p.A.
formerly Finmeccanica S.p.A., AgustaWestland S.p.A. Model AW169
and AW189 helicopters.
This proposed AD was prompted by a report of an accident of a Model AW169 helicopter, which was observed to have lost yaw control prior to the accident and a determination that additional actions are necessary to address the unsafe condition identified in Emergency AD 20182352. The FAA
is proposing this AD to address failure of the TRA feedback lever. This condition could result in loss of TR
control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. See EASA AD 20200197
for additional background information.
Related Service Information Under 1
CFR Part 51
EASA AD 20200197 requires the following actions:
Repetitive inspections of the slippage marking of the castellated nut installed on the back-end of the affected TRA.
Repetitive inspections of the roughness and breakaway force of the affected TR DB.
Repetitive installations of a thermal strip on the spacer next to the TR DB.
Repetitive checks of the condition of the thermal strip and the indicated temperature.
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Repetitive inspections/checks for particles and additional roughness of the TR DB.
Installation of an improved TRA.
Installation of an improved TR DB.
Repetitive replacements of the improved TR DB life limit.
An inspection of an affected TR DB if the thermal strip is detached, partially detached or unreadable.
Reporting information to the manufacturer.
Sending parts to the manufacturer.
Applicable corrective actions.
Corrective actions include accomplishing instructions to address the following findings: Evidence of rotation of an affected TRA nut; thermal strip temperatures that exceed specified values; and any discrepancies found during the inspection of an affected TR
DB. Discrepancies include roughness meaning lack of free and easy rotation, measured breakaway forces outside the allowed range, any wear or other damage including, but not limited to, broken seals, and the presence of particles.
EASA AD 20200197 also prohibits reinstallation of an affected TRA and an affected TR DB on a helicopter.
EASA AD 20200197 also specifies, for certain helicopters, terminating action for the repetitive inspections of the slippage marking of the castellated nut.
This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
Explanation of Required Compliance Information
FAAs Determination
EASA AD 20200197 requires sending parts to the manufacturer. This proposed AD would not require that action.
EASA AD 20200197 specifies the earlier revisions of Leonardo S.p.A.
Emergency Alert Service Bulletin EASB 169148, Revision D, dated August 4, 2020; and Leonardo S.p.A.
EASB 189237, Revision D, dated August 4, 2020; are acceptable for compliance for certain actions. This proposed AD would not allow credit for the earlier revisions.
Where Note 1 of EASA AD 20200197
allows a non-cumulative tolerance of 10
percent to be applied to the compliance times for the actions to allow for synchronization of the required actions with other maintenance tasks, this proposed AD would not allow that tolerance.
These helicopters have been approved by EASA and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAAs bilateral agreement with the European Union, EASA has notified the FAA about the unsafe condition described in its AD. The FAA is proposing this AD after evaluating all known relevant information and determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.
Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM
This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified EASA AD 20200197, described previously, as incorporated by reference, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this proposed AD and except as discussed under Differences Between this Proposed AD and EASA
AD 20200197.
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In the FAAs ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD
process, the FAA developed a process to use some civil aviation authority CAA
ADs as the primary source of information for compliance with requirements for corresponding FAA
ADs. The FAA has been coordinating this process with manufacturers and CAAs. As a result, the FAA proposes to incorporate EASA AD 20200197 by reference in the FAA final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with EASA AD 20200197
in its entirety through that incorporation, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this proposed AD.
Using common terms that are the same as the heading of a particular section in EASA AD 20200197 does not mean that operators need comply only with that section. For example, where the AD
requirement refers to all required actions and compliance times, compliance with this AD requirement is not limited to the section titled Required Actions and Compliance Times in EASA AD 20200197.
Service information required by EASA
AD 20200197 for compliance will be available at https www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA20210612 after the FAA final rule is published.
Differences Between This Proposed AD
and EASA AD 20200197
Interim Action The FAA considers this proposed AD
to be an interim action and further AD
action might follow.
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