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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 124 / Thursday, July 1, 2021 / Rules and Regulations Information, Section II.A.1, Finality, stated that the NRC does not plan or expect to be able to conduct a de novo review of the entire design if a certification renewal application is filed under 52.59, Criteria for renewal 62 FR 25800, 25805. Instead, the NRC
stated that it expects that the focus of the review would be on changes to the design that are proposed by the applicant and insights from relevant operating experience with the certified design or other designs, or other material new information arising after the NRC staffs review of the design certification. Furthermore, the standards in 52.59b control the imposition of new requirements during the review of applications for renewal. When GEH
applied to renew the U.S. ABWR DC, the NRC affirmed this position, reviewed only those aspects of the design that were amended or modified, and determined whether operating experience or other material new information indicated that additional changes to the design were necessary.
The staff reviewed GEHs proposed amendments and modifications to the design; the staff did not impose changes under 10 CFR 52.59b.
On June 12, 2009, the NRC published a rule requiring applicants for new nuclear power reactors to perform a design-specific assessment of the effects of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft 74 FR 28111. By letter dated December 7, 2010, GEH submitted its application to renew the U.S. ABWR DC
to the NRC, which included Revision 5
to the design control document. This revision includes a containment reanalysis amendment and the necessary changes to meet the requirements of 50.150, Aircraft impact assessment.
Revision 5 of the DCD also describes the aircraft impact assessment results and identifies and incorporates design features and functional capabilities to show, with reduced use of operator actions, that the reactor core remains cooled and spent fuel pool integrity is maintained.
In a letter dated July 20, 2012, the NRC identified proposed changes that were regulatory improvements or that could meet the criteria in 52.59b. The NRC suggested that GEH consider the recommendations contained in SECY
120025, Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japans March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, dated February 17, 2012, addressing Recommendations 4.2, 7.1, and 9.3 from SECY110093, NearTerm Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan, enclosure, Recommendations
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for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century; The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident report, dated July 12, 2011. Subsequently, during the Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking that resulted in 50.155, Mitigation of beyond-designbasis events, the Commission decided not to impose mitigation strategies requirements on DCs.2
After the NRCs July 20, 2012, letter to GEH, the NRC issued several requests for additional information to identity additional items or clarify the items communicated in the 2012 letter. By letter dated February 19, 2016, GEH
submitted DCD, Revision 6, to incorporate changes to the U.S. ABWR
DCD made in response to NRCs 2012
letter and to the NRCs requests for additional information. In addition, this revision transmitted corrections of typographical errors that were identified during document development, and other formatting changes. These corrections represent non-substantive changes that are editorial in nature. The NRC reviewed these typographical changes and determined that the changes do not affect the NRCs findings in the final safety evaluation report for original certification and are acceptable.
On December 20, 2019, the applicant submitted DCD, Revision 7, that incorporated the remaining changes provided in earlier responses to requests for additional information. The NRC
reviewed DCD, Revision 7, against the changes proposed in responses to requests for additional information and noted that two short paragraphs were missing from Chapter 5. On March 16, 2020, the applicant resubmitted DCD, Revision 7, Chapter 5, including the previously missing paragraphs. To ensure that the public can reference a single ADAMS package for this document, the NRC copied the original DCD, Revision 7, ADAMS package, and replaced Chapter 5 with the corrected file. This corrected ADAMS package is the collection of DCD, Revision 7, 2 In the Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events proposed rule regulatory analysis, dated October 2015, the Commission explained that its proposal to make the Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events rule inapplicable to existing DCs, which included the U.S. ABWR, was based on concluding that the issues that may be resolved in a DC and accorded issue finality may not include operational matters, such as the elements of the Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events proposed rule.
However, as discussed in SECY190066, Staff Review of NuScale Powers Mitigation Strategy for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, the design certification can provide for finality under 10 CFR
52.63 and Section VI of appendix A to 10 CFR part 52 for the adequacy of the SSCs to perform their mitigation strategies functions, as analyzed in the FSAR.

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chapters that the NRC has reviewed ADAMS Accession No. ML20093K254.
The NRCs review is documented in Supplement 2 to NUREG1503, Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design. This final rule certifies Revision 7 of the U.S. ABWR
DCD as provided in ADAMS Accession No. ML20093K254.
In a letter dated June 9, 2016, Toshiba Corporation Energy Systems and Solutions Company Toshiba withdrew its application to renew the original U.S.
ABWR design certification with its version of the U.S. ABWR design certification. The Toshiba ABWR was to incorporate the Toshiba-specific aircraft impact assessment amendment of the U.S. ABWR design certification, identified in the current appendix A to 10 CFR part 52 as the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company STPNOC DCD. The original U.S.
ABWR design certification has expired, along with its STPNOC DCD aircraft impact assessment amendment, and Toshiba has withdrawn its renewal U.S.
ABWR DC application; therefore, Toshibas STPNOC DCD with its Toshiba-specific aircraft impact assessment amendment is not considered to be a timely renewal as described in 52.57b.
In a letter dated June 22, 2018, the only U.S. ABWR combined license COL holder, Nuclear Innovation North America LLC, requested NRC approval to withdraw the COLs for South Texas Project, Units 3 and 4 COLs NPF 97 and NPF 98. The NRC approved the termination of these COLs on July 12, 2018. Since the only COL or COL
applicant who referenced the Toshiba STPNOC DCD has terminated its licenses, and no other license or application referenced the U.S. ABWR
DC, the Toshiba STPNOC DCD no longer meets the requirement for validity beyond the date of expiration under 52.55b. Finally, GEH has not requested to renew the STPNOC
amendment. For all these reasons, the NRC is not retaining the original DCD or the STPNOC DCD option in Appendix A to 10 CFR part 52. Instead, the NRC
is replacing appendix A to 10 CFR part 52 with this final rule certifying the renewed GEH U.S. ABWR design, as explained in Section IV.
IV. Discussion Final Safety Evaluation Report The final safety evaluation report for the renewed U.S. ABWR standard design consists of 1 the original final safety evaluation report published in July 1994 NUREG1503, Volume 1

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