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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 117 / Tuesday, June 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations requirements, Security measures, Waterways.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
34 CFR Chapter I

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33
CFR part 165 as follows:
PART 165REGULATED NAVIGATION
AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education.
ACTION: Interpretation.
AGENCY:

1. The authority citation for part 165
continues to read as follows:

Authority: 46 U.S.C. 70034, 70051; 33 CFR
1.051, 6.041, 6.046, and 160.5;
Department of Homeland Security Delegation No. 0170.1.

2. Add 165.T11057 to read as follows:

165.T11057 Safety Zone; Southwest Shelter Island Channel Entrance Closure, San Diego, CA.

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a Location. The following area is a safety zone: The Northeast Shelter Island Channel Entrance and all navigable waters of San Diego Bay encompassed by by a three hundred yard circle centered on the coordinate 324313.7 N, longitude 117137.8 W.
b Definitions. As used in this section, designated representative means a Coast Guard Patrol Commander, including a Coast Guard coxswain, petty officer, or other officer operating a Coast Guard vessel and a Federal, State, and local officer designated by or assisting the Captain of the Port Sector San Diego COTP in the enforcement of the safety zone.
c Regulations. 1 Under the general safety zone regulations in subpart C of this part, you may not enter the safety zone described in paragraph a of this section unless authorized by the COTP
or the COTPs designated representative.
2 To seek permission to enter, contact the COTP or the COTPs representative by VHF Channel 16.
Those in the safety zone must comply with all lawful orders or directions given to them by the COTP or the COTPs designated representative.
d Enforcement period. This section will be enforced from 8:30 a.m. until 10:30 a.m. on June 22, 2021.
Dated: June 16, 2021.
T.J. Barelli, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port Sector San Diego.
FR Doc. 202113136 Filed 62121; 8:45 am BILLING CODE 911004P

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Enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 With Respect to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Light of Bostock v. Clayton County
The U.S. Department of Education Department issues this interpretation to clarify the Departments enforcement authority over discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender identity under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 in light of the Supreme Courts decision in Bostock v. Clayton County. This interpretation will guide the Department in processing complaints and conducting investigations, but it does not itself determine the outcome in any particular case or set of facts.
DATES: This interpretation is effective June 22, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Alejandro Reyes, Director, Program Legal Group, Office for Civil Rights.
Telephone: 202 2457272. Email:
Alejandro.Reyes@ed.gov.
If you use a telecommunications device for the deaf TDD or a text telephone TTY, call the Federal Relay Service FRS, toll-free, at 1800877
8339.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background: Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681
1688, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity offered by a recipient of Federal financial assistance. The Departments Office for Civil Rights OCR is responsible for the Departments enforcement of Title IX.
OCR has long recognized that Title IX
protects all students, including students who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender, from harassment and other forms of sex discrimination. OCR also has long recognized that Title IX
prohibits harassment and other forms of discrimination against all students for not conforming to stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity. But OCR
at times has stated that Title IXs prohibition on sex discrimination does not encompass discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
To ensure clarity, the Department issues this Interpretation addressing Title IXs coverage of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity SUMMARY:

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in light of the Supreme Court decision discussed below.
In 2020, the Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731, 590 U.S. ll 2020, concluded that discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender identity inherently involve treating individuals differently because of their sex. It reached this conclusion in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 2000e et seq., which prohibits sex discrimination in employment. As noted below, courts rely on interpretations of Title VII to inform interpretations of Title IX.
The Department issues this Interpretation to make clear that the Department interprets Title IXs prohibition on sex discrimination to encompass discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and to provide the reasons for this interpretation, as set out below.
Interpretation:
Title IX Prohibits Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.
Consistent with the Supreme Courts ruling and analysis in Bostock, the Department interprets Title IXs prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex to encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. As was the case for the Courts Title VII analysis in Bostock, this interpretation flows from the statutes plain terms. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743, 174850.
Addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity thus fits squarely within OCRs responsibility to enforce Title IXs prohibition on sex discrimination.
I. The Supreme Courts Ruling in Bostock The Supreme Court in Bostock held that sex discrimination, as prohibited by Title VII, encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The Court explained that to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex. 140 S. Ct. at 1742.1 As the Court also explained, 1 The Court recognized that the parties in Bostock each presented a definition of sex dating back to Title VIIs enactment, with the employers definition referring to reproductive biology and the employees definition capturing more than anatomy. 140 S. Ct. at 1739. The Court did not adopt a definition, instead assuming the definition of sex provided by the employers that the employees had accepted for arguments sake. Id.
As the Court made clear, it did not need to adopt
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