Federal Register - March 4, 2021
Versione di testo Cosa è?Dateas è un sito indipendente non affiliato a entità governative. La fonte dei documenti PDF che pubblichiamo qui è l'entità governativa indicata in ciascuno di essi. Le versioni in testo sono trascrizioni che realizziamo per facilitare l'accesso e la ricerca di informazioni, ma possono contenere errori o non essere complete.
Source: Federal Register
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 41 / Thursday, March 4, 2021 / Proposed Rules the auction open without placing a bid.
If a bidder proactively applies an activity rule waiver using the proactive waiver function in the FCC auction bidding system during a bidding round in which no bid is placed or withdrawn if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction, the auction will remain open and the bidders eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC auction bidding system in a round in which there is no new bid, no bid withdrawal if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction, or no proactive waiver would not keep the auction open.
27. Consistent with prior Commission auctions of broadcast construction permits, OEA and MB propose that each bidder in Auction 109 be provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used as set forth above at the bidders discretion during the course of the auction. Comment is sought on this proposal of three activity rule waivers.
28. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bids. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
309j4F and 47 CFR 1.2104c, d, OEA and MB seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and a reserve price prior to the start of bidding in this auction. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which a construction permit or license will not be sold in a given auction. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the competitive bidding process.
29. OEA and MB propose not to establish separate reserve prices for the construction permits offered in this auction. OEA and MB propose to establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 109. Based on experience in past broadcast auctions, setting a minimum opening bid amount judiciously is an effective bidding tool for accelerating the competitive bidding process.
30. For Auction 109, proposed minimum opening bid amounts were determined by taking into account the type of service and class of facility offered, market size, population covered by the proposed broadcast facility, and recent broadcast transaction data, to the extent such information is available.
Attachment A to the Auction 109
Comment Public Notice lists a proposed minimum opening bid amount for each construction permit available in Auction 109. OEA and MB seek comment on the minimum opening bid amounts specified in Attachment A to the Auction 109 Comment Public Notice.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:38 Mar 03, 2021
Jkt 253001
31. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts will result in unsold construction permits, are not reasonable amounts at which to start bidding, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should explain why this is so and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters should support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested amounts or formulas for reserve prices or minimum opening bids. In establishing the minimum opening bid amounts, OEA and MB seek comment particularly on factors that could reasonably have an impact on bidders valuation of the broadcast spectrum, including the type of service and class of facility offered, market size, population covered by the proposed AM
or FM broadcast facility and any other relevant factors. Commenters also may wish to address the general role of minimum opening bids in managing the pace of the auction. For example, commenters could compare using minimum opening bidse.g., by setting higher minimum opening bids to reduce the number of rounds it takes for construction permits to reach their final pricesto other means of controlling auction pace, such as changes to bidding schedules, percentage increments, or activity requirements.
32. Bid Amounts. OEA and MB
propose that if a qualified bidder has sufficient eligibility to place a bid on a particular construction permit, in each round, the bidder will be able to place a bid on the given construction permit in any of up to nine different amounts:
The minimum acceptable bid amount or one of the additional bid amounts.
33. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts. The first of the acceptable bid amounts is called the minimum acceptable bid amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a construction permit will be equal to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally winning bid for the construction permit. Once there is a provisionally winning bid for a construction permit, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that construction permit will be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus a specified percentage of that bid amount. The percentage used for this calculation, the minimum acceptable bid increment percentage, is multiplied by the provisionally winning bid amount, and the resulting amount is added to the provisionally winning bid amount. If, for example, the minimum acceptable bid increment percentage is 10%, then the provisionally winning bid amount is multiplied by 10%. The result of that calculation is added to the
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12559
provisionally winning bid amount, and that sum is rounded using the Commissions standard rounding procedure for auctions as described in the public notice. If bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction, in the case of a construction permit for which the provisionally winning bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the construction permit.
34. Additional Bid Amounts. Under this proposal, the FCC auction bidding system will calculate the eight additional bid amounts using the minimum acceptable bid amount and an additional bid increment percentage.
The minimum acceptable bid amount is multiplied by the additional bid increment percentage. The result then will be rounded using the Commissions standard rounding procedures for auctions as described in the public notice. That result is the additional increment amount. The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount plus the additional increment amount. The second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount plus two times the additional increment amount; the third additional acceptable bid amount is the minimum acceptable bid amount plus three times the additional increment amount; etc. If, for example, the additional bid increment percentage is 5%, then the calculation of the additional increment amount would be minimum acceptable bid amount
0.05, rounded. The first additional acceptable bid amount equals minimum acceptable bid amount +
additional increment amount; the second additional acceptable bid amount equals minimum acceptable bid amount + 2additional increment amount; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals minimum acceptable bid amount +
3additional increment amount; etc.
35. For Auction 109, a minimum acceptable bid increment percentage of 10% is proposed. This means that the minimum acceptable bid amount for a construction permit will be approximately 10% greater than the provisionally winning bid amount for the construction permit. To calculate the additional acceptable bid amounts, a bid increment percentage of 5% is proposed. OEA and MB request comment on these proposals.
36. Bid Amount Changes. Consistent with past practice, OEA and MB
propose to retain the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid
E:FRFM04MRP1.SGM
04MRP1