Quiero saber acerca de...

44292

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 153 / Thursday, August 12, 2021 / Proposed Rules
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1

Assertion 2: The 50.72
nonemergency notifications are redundant with resident inspectors communications to the NRC.
In support of this assertion, the petitioner states that resident inspectors are familiar with the design and operations of nuclear power plants and are trained how to react to events that occur at the site, including when to escalate issues to NRC management. The petitioner also claims that NRC
licensees have procedures or practices in place that ensure notification of the resident inspector independent of the requirements of 50.72, and that the nonemergency notifications under 50.72 serve no unique safety function.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC disagrees with the assertion that 50.72
nonemergency notifications to the Headquarters Operations Center HOC 1
are redundant with resident inspectors communications to the NRC. The petitioner claims that licensees have procedures in place to ensure that resident inspectors are informed of these types of events and that the reports made under 50.72 are duplicated by licensee verbal reports to the onsite NRC resident inspectors. The NRC notes that the notifications to the resident inspectors as described by the petitioner are voluntary initiatives performed by the licensees; the NRC
does not require licensees to contact the resident inspector. If the NRC relies on voluntary practices alone to maintain awareness of the nonemergency events listed in 50.72b, then there is an increased risk of loss of situational awareness and the ability to make timely decisions with adequate information. The resident inspectors may receive voluntary reports from licensees but may not always be immediately available and are not expected to perform the communication duties assumed by the HOC.
Headquarters Operations Officers HOOs are always on call and have special knowledge and communication tools to enable accurate and efficient collection and dissemination of information for all types of facilities. In addition, every call to the HOO is recorded to ensure accuracy of information. Adding this burden to the resident inspectors could impact their ability to provide adequate oversight of 1 The NRC HOC is the primary center of communication and coordination among the NRC, its licensees, State and Tribal agencies, and other Federal agencies regarding operating events involving nuclear reactors or materials. Located in Rockville, MD, the NRC HOC is staffed 24 hours a day by employees trained to receive and evaluate event reports and coordinate incident response activities.

VerDate Sep<11>2014

22:35 Aug 11, 2021

Jkt 253001

the nonemergency events and decrease the speed and quality of information sharing within the NRC about nonemergency events. Further, reliance on the Resident Inspectors picking up the reporting requirement undermines the basis for the rule change as it would recognize that the need for the reporting is still necessary, it would simply shift the responsibility from the licensee to the NRC.
Assertion 3: The 50.72
nonemergency notifications distract key plant staff when they are addressing events.
The petitioner claims that elimination of the 50.72b nonemergency notifications requirement would provide a safety benefit by allowing licensees to redirect technical and engineering resources away from procedural reporting compliance activities and toward assessment and corrective action activities immediately following nonemergency events.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC disagrees, in part, with this assertion. A wide variety of events are reportable in accordance with 50.72. Likewise, the amount of effort expended to determine if the event in question is reportable varies widely. For example, a licensee should know immediately if it is issuing a press release or notifying another government agency, which is reportable under 50.72b2xi. The burden for reporting this event should be only the additional cost of calling the NRC HOO
and reporting the event without a significant amount of internal deliberation by the licensee. The onehour report for deviation from a technical specification in accordance with 50.54x serves as an example reporting requirement that should be apparent to the licensee and require minimal resources to report. On the other hand, commenters on the petition noted that other events, such as unanalyzed conditions, are less apparent and require more resources to determine if they are reportable. The time estimates provided by the commenters varied significantly. The NRC also received public comments that question whether licensees have sufficient resources to respond to events if they do not have sufficient resources to determine if an event is reportable.
This assertion also raises a concern that licensees do not have a sufficient understanding of the intent of 50.72b.
To address these concerns, the NRC
would need to perform additional analysis on each reporting requirement to determine which reporting requirements are creating these issues.
The NRC will gather additional input
PO 00000

Frm 00007

Fmt 4702

Sfmt 4702

from external stakeholders to determine the best way to resolve these concerns.
In summary, it is likely that certain reporting requirements have significantly more impact on licensees than others. As part of the rulemaking process, the NRC will hold public meetings with licensees to better understand which requirements cause these issues and how best to address them.
Assertion 4: The 50.72
nonemergency notifications that are not currently reported in a 60-day LER
under 50.73 are unrelated to reactor safety.
The petitioner asserts that the three 50.72 nonemergency notifications that do not have a corresponding requirement for a 60-day LER under 50.73 are unrelated to reactor safety.
These three requirements are 50.72b2xi, involving a news release or notification to another government agency; 50.72b3xii, involving the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility; and 50.72b3xiii, involving a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability.
The petitioner states that the first two requirements are essentially courtesy calls, and resident inspectors can handle them. The petitioner claims that 50.72b3xiii is a good example of a burdensome regulation that distracts licensee managers from the problems at hand. The petitioner claims that resident inspectors will be aware of these types of emergency preparedness problems. Furthermore, the petitioner claims that issues reported under 50.72b3xiii will be captured in the licensees corrective action program, reviewed by the resident inspector, and, as appropriate, captured in a subsequent quarterly inspection report that is made available to the public.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC disagrees, in part, with this assertion. The petitioner correctly points out the three kinds of 50.72 event notifications that have no corresponding requirement for a LER pursuant to 50.73. The NRC
believes that these reports are important for other reasons not identified by the petitioner. Although the 50.72b2xi and 3xii events do not directly impact reactor safety, the 50.72b3xiii notification allows the NRC to confirm that reasonable assurance of public health and safety and the common defense and security is maintained by quickly evaluating and ensuring that the licensee maintains its ability to effectively implement the emergency response plan or that the
E:FRFM12AUP1.SGM

12AUP1