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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 118 / Wednesday, June 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
in which the bidding system will process bids after a round ends. Bids to maintain demand are considered first and always applied. The bidding system will then process bids to change demand in order of price point, where the price point represents the percentage of the bidding interval for the round. For example, if the start-ofround price is $5,000 and the clock price is $6,000, a price of $5,100 will correspond to the 10% price point, since it is 10% of the bidding interval between $5,000 and $6,000. The bidding system will first consider intra-round bids in ascending order of price point and then bids at the clock price. The system will consider bids at the lowest price point across all PEAs, then look at bids at the next price point in all areas, and so on. If there are multiple bids at a single price point, the system will process those bids in order of a bidspecific pseudo-random number. As it considers each submitted bid during bid processing, the bidding system will determine the extent to which there is excess demand in each PEA at that point in the processing in order to determine whether a bidders request to reduce demand can be applied.
Likewise, the auction bidding system will evaluate the activity associated with the bidders most recently determined demands at that point in the processing to determine whether a request to increase demand can be applied.
213. Because in any given round some bidders may request to increase demands for licenses while others may request reductions, the price point at which a bid is considered by the bidding system can affect whether it is applied. Bids not applied because of insufficient aggregate demand or insufficient eligibility will be held in a queue and considered, again in order, if there should be excess demand or sufficient eligibility later in the processing after other bids are processed.
214. Therefore, once a round closes, the bidding system will process bids to change demand by first considering the bid submitted at the lowest price point and determining the maximum extent to which that bid can be applied given bidders demands as determined at that point in the bid processing. If the bid can be applied either in full or partially, the number of blocks the bidder holds at that point in the processing will be adjusted, and aggregate demand will be recalculated accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied in full, the unfulfilled bid, or portion thereof, will be held in a queue to be considered later during bid processing
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for that round. The bidding system will then consider the bid submitted at the next highest price point, applying it in full, in part, or not at all, given the most recently determined demands of bidders. Any unfulfilled requests will again be held in the queue, and aggregate demand will again be recalculated. Every time a bid or part of a bid is applied, the unfulfilled bids held in the queue will be reconsidered, in the order of the original price points of the bids and by pseudo-random number, in the case of tied price points.
The auction bidding system will not carry over unfulfilled bid requests to the next round, however. The bidding system will advise bidders of the status of their bids when round results are released.

the extent of excess demand for blocks in each product.

e. Price Determination 215. OEA and WTB further adopt bid processing procedures that will determine, based on aggregate demand, the posted price for each product for the round, which will serve as the start-ofround price for the next round. The uniform price for all of the blocks in a product will increase from round to round as long as there is excess demand for blocks in the product but will not increase if aggregate demand does not exceed the available supply of blocks.
216. Under these procedures, if at the end of a round the aggregate demand for blocks in the product exceeds the supply of blocks, the posted price will equal the clock price for the round. If a reduction in demand was applied during the round and caused demand in the product to equal supply, the posted price will be the price at which the reduction was applied. If aggregate demand is less than or equal to supply and no bid to reduce demand was applied for the product, then the posted price will equal the start-of-round price for the round. The range of acceptable bid amounts for the next round will be set by adding the percentage increment to the posted price.
217. When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the uniform price for the product will stop increasing at that point, since the partial application of the bid will result in demand falling to equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a bid to reduce demand that cannot be fully applied will not face a price for the remaining demand that is higher than its bid price.
218. After the bids of the round have been processed, if the stopping rule has not been met, the FCC auction bidding system will announce clock prices to indicate a range of acceptable bids for the next round. Each bidder will be informed of its processed demand and
B. Assignment Phase
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9. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase 219. Under the clock auction format for Auction 110, if the reserve price to meet the CSEA requirement is met in the clock phase, bidders with processed demand for a product at the time the stopping rule is met will become the winning bidders of licenses corresponding to that number of blocks and will be assigned specific frequencies in the assignment phase.
The final clock phase price for a generic block in a product will be the posted price for the final round. This and other Auction 110 bid processing details are addressed in the Auction 110 Clock Phase Technical Guide.
220. Following the conclusion of the clock phase, if the reserve price to satisfy the CSEA requirement has been met, the assignment phase will follow.
As proposed, in the assignment phase, in a series of bidding rounds, each clock phase winning bidder will have the opportunity to indicate its preferences for specific frequency licenses corresponding to the generic blocks it won in each category in the clock phase.
As proposed, a bidder will be assigned contiguous frequencies for blocks it wins within each category and PEA
regardless of whether it chooses to bid in the assignment phase. As set forth below, OEA and WTB adopt an additional assignment procedure to address commenter concerns that the procedures, as proposed, did not take contiguity across categories into account.
1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs 221. As proposed, OEA will sequence assignment rounds to make it easier for bidders to incorporate frequency assignments from previously assigned areas into their bid preferences for other areas, recognizing that bidders winning multiple blocks of licenses generally will prefer contiguous blocks across adjacent PEAs. To that end, OEA will conduct rounds for the largest markets first to enable bidders to establish a footprint from which to work.
222. Specifically, OEA will conduct a separate assignment round for each of the top 20 PEAs and to conduct these assignment rounds sequentially, beginning with the largest PEA. Once the top 20 PEAs have been assigned, OEA will conduct, for each Regional Economic Area Grouping REAG, a series of assignment rounds for the remaining PEAs within that region.

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