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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 109 / Wednesday, June 9, 2021 / Proposed Rules
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1

We believe this proposal will protect Americans from illegal robocallsand especially illegally spoofed robocalls by ensuring that voice service providers most likely to be the source of illegal robocalls authenticate calls sooner, allowing terminating voice service providers to know if the caller ID is legitimate and take action as appropriate, including by blocking or labeling suspicious calls. We propose to take this action within the framework of the TRACED Act, which we interpret to require us to balance the hardship of compliance faced by voice service providers with the benefit to the public of implementing STIR/SHAKEN
expeditiously. We also seek comment on how to define which small voice service providers should receive a shortened extension and on ways to monitor compliance.
A. Basis for Action 8. We propose concluding that a subset of small voice service providers is often . . . responsible for illegal robocalls, is originating an increasingly disproportionate amount of such calls compared to larger voice service providers, and should therefore be subject to a shortened extension.
9. A March 2021 report released by Transaction Network Services, a provider of call analytics, found that the problem of robocalls originated by certain smaller voice service providers has gotten worse: By the end of 2020, almost 95% of high risk calls originate from non-Tier-1 telephone resources, up 3% from last year. We seek comment on these data and our proposed conclusion that certain small voice service providers are a disproportionate source of these calls.
Are commenters able to supply additional new data that address to this issue? Transaction Network Services previously stated in its 2020 comments that its data show, through the end of 2018, 87% of problematic calls originate . . . on non-Tier 1 networks even though the top 6 carriers represent almost 75% of . . . total calls. We have now had additional time to evaluate this comment and other information discussed below that predates adoption of the Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order compared to the very short time period between USTelecom filing its proposal and adoption of the Second Caller ID
Authentication Report and Order. In our preliminary view, this information supports revisiting the scope of the small voice service provider extension.
We seek comment on this view and on how we should now consider relevant evidence that predates adoption of the
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Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order.
10. With additional time to consider the issue, we now believe that evidence from Commission filings of providers subject to government-wide enforcement actions also supports a finding that a subset of small voice service providers are at heightened risk of originating a disproportionate number of illegal robocalls relative to their subscriber base. For example, in January 2020, the FTC sent letters to 19
providers regarding their possible involvement in assisting and facilitating unlawful robocalls. Data submitted to the Commission reflect that most of these providers appear to fall under the Commission definition of small voice service provider. Of the 19 providers that received letters, five submitted FCC Form 477, and of those five, only one had more than 100,000
access lines. Sixteen of the providers that received a January 2020 FTC letter also submitted an FCC Form 499. These forms, on average, showed end-user revenues of approximately $3.4 million, indicating that most of these 16
providers had fewer than 100,000 lines.
A provider with $3.4 million in revenue would be realizing just $2.83 in revenue per month per subscriber if it had exactly 100,000 subscribers.
Because we believe $2.83 to be unrealistically low, we think it reasonable to infer that these providers, on average, have fewer than 100,000
subscribers and a higher revenue per subscriber. This additional information supports our proposed conclusion that a subset of small voice service providers are at heightened risk of disproportionately originating robocalls.
We seek comment on the data and assumptions underlying this conclusion. Specifically, we seek comment on whether we can rely on FCC Form 477 line count data to determine whether providers fall within our 100,000 line small voice service provider definition and whether it is reasonable to conclude that FCC Form 499 revenue data is predictive of provider line counts. Are there other data we should consider?
11. We also seek comment on whether the proportion of robocall traffic originated by small voice service providers has increased since the adoption of the Second Caller ID
Authentication Report and Order and, if so, whether it is because larger voice service providers are implementing STIR/SHAKEN in anticipation of the June 30, 2021, deadline, leading callers originating unlawful robocalls to migrate to different networks. Several larger voice service providers have
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recently submitted statements that they are in the process of implementing, or have already implemented, STIR/
SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks. Is the portion of robocall traffic attributable to small voice service providers likely to increase further as larger voice service providers complete STIR/SHAKEN implementation?
12. Consumer complaints received by the Commission make clear that unwanted robocalls remain a vexing problem. We invite commenters to provide other information about trends in illegal robocalls. We also seek comment on the effect that the Commissions efforts have had on illegal robocalling in general and, specifically, on illegal robocalls originated by small voice service providers. The available evidence indicates that, at least in part due to the TRACED Act and Commission action, the percentage of STIR/SHAKEN-attested traffic has increased, with Transaction Network Services estimating that it had increased from 21 percent in January 2020 to 35
percent in December 2020. We seek comment on these data and trends in STIR/SHAKEN deployment, particularly among small voice service providers.
B. Proposed Curtailment of Extension for Small Voice Service Providers That Originate an Especially Large Amount of Traffic 13. In light of the foregoing data and additional time to consider USTelecoms submission, we propose shortening the small voice service provider extension for small voice service providers that originate an especially large amount of calls. As discussed below, we propose only to shorten the small voice service provider extension, and not the other extensions the Commission previously granted that could also apply to certain small voice service providers. See infra para. 19.
We seek comment on this proposal.
14. Although the Commission previously found that a two-year blanket extension for all small voice service providers was reasonable in part because they only serve a small percentage of subscribers, we propose revisiting this conclusion and determining that it is not a sufficient basis for continuing to provide a twoyear extension for all such providers.
We seek comment on this proposal. In particular, given the evidence indicating a subset of small voice service providers are at heightened risk of originating a significant percentage of illegal robocalls, in our preliminary view, a small quantity of subscribers should not alone be a sufficient basis for a two-year extension for all small voice service
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