Quiero saber acerca de...

jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 4 / Thursday, January 7, 2021 / Rules and Regulations afresh. To the extent that these commenters suggest that we therefore must reopen the issues in the Restoring Internet Freedom Order more broadly, we reject that claim. The DHS action at issue in DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. had been both vacated and remanded in full. The relevant problem that DHS was dealing with there thus was the entirety of its action.
Here, by contrast, the D.C. Circuit declined to vacate the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, leaving it in place while directing the Commission to address three discrete points. In this context, it is most reasonable to define the problem that we consider afresh here to be the effect of the regulatory approach in the Restoring Internet Freedom Order on the public safety, pole attachment, and Lifeline universal service support issues identified by the Mozilla court. Insofar as commenters raise issues beyond the scope of the remanded issues, we reject them as outside the scope of this proceeding.
While in some cases commenters raise issues with no clear nexus to the remanded issues at all, in other cases commenters raise arguments that potentially encompass, but extend beyond, the remanded issues. We reject arguments only insofar as they fall outside or extend beyond the remanded issues, and otherwise consider them in our analyses of public safety, pole attachments, and Lifeline support, respectively, insofar as they do in fact bear on any of those issues. Taking up those broader issues here would unsettle reasoning and decisions not rejected by the court, giving usand parties supportive of the Restoring Internet Freedom Orders regulatory approacha task on remand that not only was not required but that could not reasonably have been anticipated by Mozillas remand of three discrete points. For example, commenters relitigate the question whether the Commission was correct in predicting that Title I classification would promote competition, investment, and innovationa finding that was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit and is outside the scope of the remand. While many commenters argue that experience following the Restoring Internet Freedom Order has borne out the Commissions prediction, some argue that Title I classification has had no effect in investment, and others still claim that it has decreased investment.
We need not and cannot settle this dispute here: Because such issues lie outside the scope of the remand, commenters did not have a full and fair opportunity to address these issues in
VerDate Sep<11>2014

16:55 Jan 06, 2021

Jkt 253001

the same comprehensive way that they did prior to the Restoring Internet Freedom Order. Perhaps for that reason, the evidence offered in this proceeding fails to grapple with the effect of Title I classification on competition, investment, and innovation with nearly the same depth of analysis as the studies submitted in the Restoring Internet Freedom record, and therefore nothing in the comments in this remand proceeding provides firm ground to revisit the predictive judgment that we have already made. Should parties wish to raise issues beyond those subject to the D.C. Circuits remand in support of a request for new rules, they may do so in a petition for rulemaking supporting their request for such broader action.
E. The Order on Remand Is Consistent With the First Amendment 102. Our Order on Remand also is consistent with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Contrary to the suggestion of some commenters, neither the classification of broadband internet access service as an information service nor the Restoring Internet Freedom Remand PN seeking comment on the Mozilla remand represents a government restriction on speech that requires scrutiny under the First Amendment. In particular, we are not persuaded that actions taken by broadband internet access service providers to manage traffic on their networks constitutes governmental action. Nor does the record support the view that the request for comments in the Restoring Internet Freedom Remand PN somehow compelled, restricted, or otherwise chilled private parties speech.
III. Procedural Matters 103. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document does not contain new or modified information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 PRA, Public Law 10413. In addition, therefore, it does not contain any new or modified information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25
employees, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506c4.
104. Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, concurs that this rule is non-major under the Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 8042. The Commission will send a copy of this Order on Remand to Congress and the Government
PO 00000

Frm 00085

Fmt 4700

Sfmt 4700

1017

Accountability Office pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 801a1A.
105. People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities braille, large print, electronic files, audio format, send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 2024180530 voice, 2024180432 tty.
106. For further information about this rulemaking proceeding, please contact Annick Banoun, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at 202 4181521 or annick.banoun@fcc.gov.
IV. Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 107. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended RFA, this Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis Supplemental FRFA supplements the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis FRFA included in the 2019 Lifeline Order in WC Docket Nos. 17287, 11
42, and 09197, to the extent required by the adoption of this Order on Remand. The Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the 2017 Lifeline NPRM, including comment on the initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. This Supplemental FRFA conforms to the RFA.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Order on Remand 108. The Commission is required by section 254 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to promulgate rules to implement the universal service provisions of section 254. The Lifeline program was implemented in 1985 in the wake of the 1984 divestiture of AT&T. On May 8, 1997, the Commission adopted rules to reform its system of universal service support mechanisms so that universal service is preserved and advanced as markets move toward competition. Since the 2012 Lifeline Order, the Commission has acted to address waste, fraud, and abuse in the Lifeline program and improved program administration and accountability.
109. In this Order on Remand, the Commission addresses several items remanded to it by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Mozilla v. FCC. As part of addressing those issues, the Commission clarifies its legal authority for reimbursing broadband internet access service through the Lifeline program. This clarification requires minor revisions to the Commissions Lifeline rules. With this action, we fulfill the Commissions role as the steward of the Universal Service Fund
E:FRFM07JAR1.SGM

07JAR1